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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE TRIBAL CONTEXT: A
MADNESS TO EPA'S METHOD
BY
CATHERINE A. O'NEILL*
Many American Indian tribes and their members are among those
most burdened by mercury contamination. When the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) set out to regulate mercury emissions from
coal-fired utlities, it was aware that mercury contamination and
regulation affects tribal nghts and resources. EPA's inquiry, therefore
ought to have been differently framed, given tribes' unique legal and
political status. Specifically, EPA ought to have confronted squarely the
impact of its decision on tribes' fishing rights, rather than consider
these rights as a mere afterthought. EPA 's process, too, should have
been differently conducted EPA should have consulted with tribes
from the outset, in an effort to comprehend what was at stake from
tribes' perspectives. Although EPA purported to consider
environmental justice as it developed its "Clean Air Mercury Rule, "it
failed utterly In this rulemaing, EPA perpetuated, rather than
ameliorated, a long history of cultural discrimination against tribes and
their members. This Article examines the missteps in EPA 's work with
the mercury rule, in the hope that the lessons gleaned here might help
EPA ' future efforts to consider and respond to environmental injustice
in the tribal context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rivers flowing through the [Bad River] Reservation and Lake Superior itself
are important spawning grounds for sturgeon, lake-run trout, and walleye as
well as many other fish, which make up a significant subsistence resource for
the 1,200 Tribal members living on the Reservation and in the surrounding area.
However, Band members, like many other Americans, need to restrict their fish
consumption to avoid mercury poisoning.... It is unacceptable to continue to
let our children be exposed to such a dangerous toxin while partaking of a food
source that tribal members have enjoyed for centuries; a food source that
should be a healthy part of their diet.
Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians'
Over the last several decades this toxic substance, mercury, has caused many
human health and ecological problems for Indian people.... Mercury is known
to seriously impact fish eating wildlife such as loons and mink. These animals
are a value to the ecosystem they inhabit and they are clan symbols for Tribal
members. If these animals are threatened, Tribal culture is threatened.
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe2
GLIFWC's member tribes are particularly concerned about mercury
contamination of ogaa (walleye), within the area ceded to the United States in
treaties with the Chippewa dated July 29, 1837, and October 4, 1842. These
treaties guaranteed to the Chippewa tribes certain hunting, fishing and
1 Letter from Donald Moore Sr., Tribal Chairman, Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of
Chippewa Indians, to Micheal Leavitt, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectld=09000064800ac810&dispositio
n=attachment&contentType=pdf [hereinafter Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of
Chippewa Indians, Comments on the Proposed CAMR] (providing comments on the Proposed
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed
Standards for Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Steam-Generating
Units, Docket No. OAR-2002-0056-21 18).
2 Letter from Norm W. Deschampe, President, The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, to Micheal
Leavitt, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064800b28Th&disposition=attachment&contentType
=pdf [hereinafter The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA] (providing comments on
Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative,
Proposed Standards for Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Steam-
Generating Units, Docket No. OAR-2002-0056-3325).
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gathering rights in the ceded territory. The purpose of this guarantee was to
ensure that the tribes could continue their way of life to meet subsistence,
economic, cultural, spiritual and medicinal needs....
Fishing and fish consumption are central to Chippewa (or Anishinaabe)
culture. The practice of harvesting, sharing, and consuming ogaa (walleye) is
passed down from generation to generation.... While these practices preserve
traditional Anishinaabe 'lifeways,' there is concern in tribal communities that
methylmercury in ogaa may pose serious threats to the health of tribal
members' young and unborn children and therefore the continuation of these
traditional lifeways.
Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC) 3
Although many of our Tribal members continue to fish and consume fish
despite [Maine's statewide] fish consumption advisory, there are many Tribal
families that no longer engage in cultural practices associated with fishing, and
are thus not passing these traditions to new generations of Tribal members.
The loss of our cultural ceremonies, language, and songs associated with
fishing represents a significant impact on our Tribe, and results in permanent
loss of the culture which defines our Tribe.
Aroostook Band of Micmacs4
When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced its
proposed rule for mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities,' tribe after
tribe tried to impress upon EPA the multiple and profound impacts of
mercury contamination from their perspectives. Tribe after tribe sought to
move EPA to consider the children who would forever suffer neurological
damage and other harms. Tribe after tribe came forward with data for EPA
that described the particular circumstances relevant to members' exposure.
3 Letter from James H. Schlender, Executive Adm'r, Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife
Comm'n (GLIFWC), to Envtl. Prot. Agency (June 29, 2004), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
fdmspublic/ContentViewerobjectld=09000064800b392e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pd
f [hereinafter Letter from GLIFWC to EPA] (providing comments on Proposed National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards
for Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Steam-Generating Units,
Docket No. OAR-2002-0056-3527). The Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission "has
eleven member tribes: the Bad River, Lac Courte Orelles, Lac du Flambeau, Red Cliff,
Sokaogon (Mole Lake), and St. Croix tribes in Wisconsin; the Mille Lacs and Fond du Lac tribes
in Minnesota; and the Bay Mills, Keweenaw Bay and Lac Vieux Desert tribes in Michigan." Id.
4 Letter from William W. Phillips, Tribal Chief, Aroostook Band of Micmacs, to Envtl. Prot.
Agency (Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?
objectld=09000064800ae485&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [hereinafter Aroostook
Band of Micmacs, Letter to EPA] (providing comments on Proposed National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards for
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Steam-Generating Units, Docket
No. OAR-2002-0056-2483).
5 Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the
Alternative, Proposed Standards for Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (to be
codified at 40 CFR pts. 60, 63) [hereinafter EPA, Proposed Mercury Rule].
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And tribe after tribe took pains to remind EPA of its obligations under
treaties and other laws, given tribes' unique political and legal status.
The rulemaking process, however, revealed an agency intent on
providing a reprieve from regulation to coal-fired utilities, despite what this
commitment meant for the health and life prospects of millions of children.
It showed an agency seemingly unconcerned with any legal obligations or
executive commitments to the tribes, despite the hostility to American
Indian peoples implicit in this stance. Ultimately, it resulted in a final rule,
which EPA dubbed the "Clean Air Mercury Rule" (CAMR), 6 completely
divorced from the relevant statutory directives under the Clean Air Act-a
point underscored by the D.C. Circuit's stern rebuke to EPA when it vacated
the CAMR in New Jersey v. Environmental Protection Agency(New Jersey v.
EPA) in February, 2008.
7
Given the antipathy of the second Bush Administration to
environmental regulation in general it is perhaps unsurprising that the EPA's
work on the CAMR is not a model for considering environmental justice in
the tribal context. It is an understatement to say that the Bush EPA has been
unsympathetic to calls for environmental justice, whether from tribes or
other affected groups. Instead, the Bush EPA has flouted its obligations to
protect human and environmental health at virtually every turn. Indeed, the
Bush EPA has been particularly bold in its willingness to disregard its
statutory and other legal commands, to the point that the courts-ordinarily
deferential-have felt obligated to rein it in.' Thus, one can hope that we
have witnessed a high water mark in terms of the agency's disdain for its
mission and indifference to those harmed by its decisions. And, happily, the
D.C. Circuit's result in New Jersey v. EPA means that the EPA must go back
to the drawing board and produce a rule that is consistent with its legal
obligations.9 As such, some of the most glaring deficiencies in the CAMR will
need to be remedied, with some of the dire impacts to tribes and their
members ameliorated as a consequence. Still, it seems important to examine
6 Standards for Performance for New and Existing Sources: Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) [hereinafter EPA, Final CAMR] (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75).
7 New Jersey v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (New Jersey v. EPA), Nos. 05-1097, 05-1104, 05-1116,
05-1118, 05-1158, 05-1159, 05-1160, 05-1162, 05-1163, 05-1164, 05-1167, 05-1174, 05-1175, 05-1176,
05-1183, 05-1189, 05-1263, 05-1267, 05-1270, 05-1271, 05-1275, 05-1277, 06-1211, 06-1220, 06-1231,
06-1287, 06-1291, 06-1293, 06-1294, 2008 WL 341338, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 2008). See also David
A. Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, Court ReJects Emission 'Trades,' WAsH. POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at
A03.
8 See, e.g., Harvard Law Review Ass'n, The Supreme Court 2006 Term Leading Cases,
§ (1II)(G)(3), 121 HARV. L. REv. 415, 416 (2007), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
issues/121Inov07/nov07.shtml (observing that the Supreme Court, in the 2006 term, issued "a
rebuke to the White House's ideological approach to environmental policy" and signaled a
"retreat from providing expansive judicial deference toward presidential control over the
administrative branch").
9 New Jersey v. EPA, 2008 WL 341338, at * 4 (ruling that, because coal-fired utilities had
been listed as a source category for regulation under Clean Air Act § 112, EPA could not later
rescind this listing without making the specific findings required by section 112(c)(9) of the
Clean Air Act, which EPA conceded it had not made, and vacating and remanding the CAMR).
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EPA's analysis of the CAMR for the lessons it might provide for agencies'
future efforts to consider environmental justice in the tribal context. 10
Part II of this Article provides background for EPA's decision. This Part
explains the sources and effects of mercury contamination and sketches the
history of EPA's efforts at mercury regulation. This Part closes by observing
that many tribes and their members are prominent among those harmet by
mercury contamination and pointing out that EPA should therefore have
been aware of the particular constellation of legal obligations and normative
considerations that governed its work. Part III elaborates the touchstones
for considering environmental justice in the tribal context. This Part
discusses tribes' unique legal and political status, focusing in particular on
the treaty-secured rights to fish that belong to most of the fishing tribes. It
also discusses tribes' different experience of the harms of mercury
contamination. Part IV argues that, while EPA purported to consider
environmental justice in the CAMR rulemaking, EPA failed to account
adequately for tribes' unique circumstances. This Part scrutinizes the rule
and its supporting analyses in an effort to glean lessons that might inform
EPA's efforts in the future, in concert with affected tribes, to make progress
toward environmental justice.
II. MERCURY CONTAMINATION AND REGULATION
In order to explore EPA's analysis of the CAMR, it is important to
appreciate the backdrop against which EPA worked. Specifically, it is
necessary to understand mercury's human and ecological health effects, the
sources of mercury releases to the environment, the chief pathway for
human exposure to methylmercury, and the current extent of human
exposure. It is also important to consider the history of efforts to regulate
mercury under the Clean Air Act, including the particular events leading up
EPA's issuance of its final rule governing mercury emissions from coal-fired
utilities.
A. Mercury Contamination
Mercury has long been known to be highly toxic to humans."1
Methymercury is a potent neurotoxin. The developing fetus and children are
particularly sensitive to methylmercury's adverse neurological effects.12
10 This is not to suggest that EPA's failure to meaningfully regulate mercury does not have
grave consequences for those in other groups, including various communities of color and low-
income communities, nor to downplay the flaws in EPA's environmental justice analysis vis-k-
vis these groups. The observations in this Article, however, are limited to the particular
circumstances of tribes and their members. Nonetheless, it may be that some of the criticisms
leveled herein hold for other groups as well.
11 COMM. ON THE ToXIcOLOGIcAL EFFECTS OF METHYLMERCURY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL
(NRC), TOxIcOLOGICAL EFFECTs OF METHYLMERCURY 175-81 (2000) [hereinafter NRC,
METHYLMERCURY].
12 Leonardo Trasande et al., Publie Health and Economic Consequences of Methyl Mercury
Toxicity to the Developing Brain, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 590, 594 (2005) [hereinafter
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Exposure to even small amounts of methylmercury during this
developmental window can lead to irreversible neurological damage.'
3
Methylmercury exposure has also been associated with cardiac
abnormalities in children and adverse cardiovascular effects in adults.
14
Mercury is toxic to other species as well. Methylmercury exposure has
been associated with adverse neurological and reproductive effects,
behavioral abnormalities, and even death in birds and mammals that depend
on fish, including loons, kingfishers, osprey, bald eagles, river otters, minks,
and the endangered Florida panther. 5
Once released into the environment, mercury's behavior is complex,
and includes local, regional, and global components. 16 Anthropogenic
sources of mercury increasingly account for these releases, although natural
processes contribute as well. Anthropogenic emissions of mercury in the
United States are currently dominated by coal-fired utilities. 17 Mercury is
emitted from utilities in three species, each of which is characterized by a
different fate and transport in the environment.18 In every case, this mercury
is deposited to surrounding land and water, although at varying distances
and times. Mercury that enters water bodies becomes methylated by
microorganisms present in these aquatic environments. 9 Methylmercury is
an extremely bioavailable form of mercury, readily taken up by fish in these
waters. Methylmercury bioaccumulates in fish tissue, which in turn becomes
Trasande et al., Economic Consequences of Mercury] (citing adverse effects on those exposed
in utero and additional adverse effects on those exposed as neonates and infants up to age two,
when blood-brain barrier remains vulnerable). See also Leonardo Trasande et al., Applying Cost
Analyses to Drive Policy That Protects Children: Mercury as a Case Study, 1076 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SC. 911, 919 (2006) [hereinafter Trasande et al., Cost Analyses and Mercury Policy];
Letter from Melanie A. Marty, Children's Health Prot. Advisory Comm., to Michael Leavitt,
Adm'r., Envtl. Prot. Agency, at 6 (Jan. 26, 2004) (providing comments to the Proposed Mercury
Rule, Docket 2002-0056-5570) ("In addition to exposure in utero, infants and children have
ongoing dietary exposure to methylmercury. Children and infants are sensitive to mercury's
effects because their nervous systems continue to develop until about age 20.").
13 NRC, METHYLMERCURY, supra note 11, at 16-18.
14 Philippe Grandjean et al., Cardiac Autonomic Activity in Methylmercury Neurotoxicity:
14-Year Follow-Up of a Faroese Birth Cohort, 144 J. PEDIATRICS 169, 172-73 (2004); Elisio
Guallar et al., Mercury, Fish Oils, and the Risk of Myocardial Infarction, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1747 (2002); see also NRC, METHYLMERCURY supra note 11, at 175-81.
15 OFFICE OF AIR QUALrrY PLANNING & STANDARDS & OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, 1 MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-43 to 3-45 (1997), available at
http://www.epagov/ttn/caaa/t3/reports/volumel.pdf [hereinafter MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO
CONGRESS].
16 For discussions of aspects of the mercury cycle available to EPA at the time of the
rulemaking, see id. at 3-1 to 3-5; NRC, METHYLMERCURY, supra note 11, at 13-17.
17 NE. STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT., MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED
POWER PLANTS, THE CASE FOR REGULATORY ACTION 2-1 to 2-2 (2003), available at
www.nescaum.org/documents/pr03ll04mercury.pdf (noting that coal-fired power plants
account for 40.8% of the United States' total mercury output from anthropogenic sources).
18 Id at 2-4 (specifying that mercury is emitted in its elemental form, its oxidized form, and
adsorbed to particulates).
19 See NRC, METHYLMERCURY, supra note 11, at 18 ("Conversion of inorganic Hg [mercury]
to MeHg [methylmercury] occurs primarily in microorganisms especially in aquatic systems.").
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a source of exposure to other fish, birds, mammals, and humans that
consume this fish tissue.
20
Many of the fish species on which humans rely for food are highly
contaminated with methylmercury. In fact, humans are exposed to
methylmercury primarily through the consumption of contaminated fish.2'
However, there is considerable variability among humans with respect to
fish consumption practices.22 There is also considerable variability among
fish species with respect to the concentration of methylmercury harbored.
23
As a consequence, different people will have quite different levels of
exposure. Some Native Americans, for example, are very highly exposed.
24
Members of the fishing tribes consume fish in greater amounts, at higher
frequencies, and in accordance with different seasonal or cultural
constraints than members of the general population.25 Members of the
fishing tribes also often consume species that are relatively highly
contaminated.
Based on studies of methylmercury's adverse human health effects,
EPA has derived a reference dose (RfD) of 0.1 microgram per kilogram of
body weight per day.26 This RfD represents a threshold for exposure, i.e., the
amount that EPA believes can be ingested each day over the course of a
lifetime without adverse health effects.27 According to a recent study, some
15.7% of women of childbearing age in the United States had blood mercury
levels above EPA's RfD, thus posing a risk to a developing fetus.2"
Importantly, this study also found marked differences among women in
groups characterized by race/ethnicity. Whereas 15.3% of "white" women of
childbearing age had mercury in their blood above the RfD, this number
more than doubles, to 31.5%, for women who identified themselves as
'other," a category comprised primarily of Native Americans, Pacific
Islanders, those of "Asian origin," or those of "mixed race."
29
As a consequence of mercury contamination, health and elnvironmental
agencies have had to issue fish consumption advisories recommending that
women and children reduce or eliminate entirely their consumption of some
fish species.30 In the 1990s, advisories due to mercury were increasingly
20 See id at 18 (describing the process through which MeHg "bioaccumulates up the food
chain," resulting in "human and piscivorous wildlife exposure to MeHg").
21 See id at 1.
22 See, e.g., Catherine A. O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 EN'rL. L. REP. 11,070,
11,075-79 (2004) [hereinafter O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice].
23 Id
24 Id
25 See MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 4-23 (displaying fish
consumption rates in various percentiles of the general U.S. population and in various
percentiles of various tribal populations).
26 Id at 0-2.
27 NRC, METHYLMERCURY, supra note 11, at 2 n.2.
28 Kathryn R. Mahaffey et al., Blood Organic Mercury and Dietary Mercury Intake: National
Health and Nutn'tion Examination Survey, 1999 and 2000, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 562, 565
(2004).
29 Id at 565.
30 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Fish Advisories, Basic Information, http://www.epagov/
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issued throughout the United States, with some states having to place all of
their lakes, rivers, and coastal waters under advisory. In 2001, widespread
methylmercury contamination prompted the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the EPA. to issue the first-ever national fish consumption
advisory.
31
B. EPA 's Efforts to Regulate Mercury
During this time, EPA took steps to regulate the major sources of
mercury emissions. In the 1990s, it issued standards for two of the top three
categories of emitters-medical waste incinerators and municipal waste
combustors-requiring that these sources reduce their mercury emissions
on the order of 90%.32 In 2000, EPA listed the third of these major
contributors-coal-fired utilities-among the source categories to be
regulated under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, finding regulation of
mercury from these sources to be "appropriate and necessary."3 As a
consequence of this listing, it was widely expected that EPA would require
similarly significant reductions in utilities' mercury emissions.34 Crucially, it
was also widely expected that these reductions would be realized quickly.3"
These expectations stemmed from important features of section 112 of the
Clean Air Act, ushered in by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to address
the inaction and delay that had plagued earlier versions of the Act.
Specifically, EPA is directed to issue technology-based standards (known as
MACT standards) for those source categories listed under section 112, and
sources are given a tight, three-year timeline to comply with the resulting
emissions limits (with the possibility of, at most, a one-year extension).,
6
EPA is further directed to issue additional standards, within eight years, if
this MACT standard leaves unaddressed any residual risk to human or
environmental health. Thus, up until the time that EPA announced its
waterscience/fish/basic.htn (last visited Apr. 13, 2008). See also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nati
Listing of Fish Advisories, General Fact Sheet 2005/06 NatY Listing, http://www.epa-gov/
waterscience/fish/advisories/2006/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (reporting that mercury
is at least partly responsible for 80% of all fish consumption advisories).
31 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Talk Paper, FDA Announces Advisory of Methyl Mercury in
Fish (Jan. 12, 2001), http-//www.fdagovbbstopics/ANSWERS/2001/ANS01065.htin (last visited
Apr. 13, 2008). This advisory was reiterated and expanded to include additional fish species in
2004. U.S. ENVTL PRoT. AGENCY & FDA, WHAT You NEED TO KNow ABoUT MERCURY IN FISH AND
SHELLFISH, available athttp'//www.epa.gov/waterscience/fish/MethylmercuryBrochure.pdf.
32 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 subpts. Ce, Ec (hospital medical waste incinerators); id. subpts. Cb, Eb
(HospitalfMedcalfnfectious waste incinerators); id subpt. 5. Cb, Eb (municipal waste
combustors); see O'Neill, Mercury, Risk and Just'ce, supra note 22, at 11,081.
33 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric Utility
Steam-Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,825-26 (Dec. 20, 2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) (2000).
34 See O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 22, at 11,081.
35 See id; see also RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM: How POLLUTION AND
HoLLow GOVERNMENT HURT OUR KIDs 114-15 (2008) (discussing EPA's promise to finalize MACT
standards by December 2003).
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(1), (d)(2), (i)(3)(A) (2000).
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proposed rule for coal-fired utilities in December 2003, observers looked
forward to a MACT standard that would require these sources to achieve
roughly 90% reductions in their mercury emissions, and to do so by 2007.
31
Instead, the EPA set out two alternative proposals to address mercury
from coal-fired utilities: a cap-and-trade program (to be issued under either
section 112 or section 111), and a watered-down version of a MACT standard
(one that would require only approximately a 55% reduction in emissions)
under section 112.3 EPA's proposed rule was highly controversial. It
fomented a record number of public comments, Congressional hearings, and
requests for oversight, and considerable criticism from almost every quarter.
In its final rule, EPA abandoned any pretense of providing a MACT
standard. Rather, EPA opted for a cap-and-trade program, promulgated
under section 111. The CAMR instates a cap on mercury emissions from
utilities in two phases. The first-phase cap is set for 2010 to require no
additional reductions beyond those already to be achieved as "co-benefits"
of a companion rule, known as the "Clean Air Interstate Rule" (CAIR),
governing criteria pollutants in the eastern portion of the country. Thus, the
CAMR's first-phase cap is set to allow utilities to emit thirty-eight tons of
mercury per year-down from roughly forty-eight tons per year emitted by
these sources at the outset of the program. The second-phase cap is set for
2018 to allow utilities to emit fifteen tons of mercury per year. However,
given structural features of the cap-and-trade program, the 70% reduction in
emissions that this second-phase cap promises will not actually be realized
until well after the year 2020,19 and perhaps even as late as the 2030s.a0 Note,
37 See O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 22, at 11,081.
38 EPA, Proposed Mercury Rule, supra note 5. For discussion of the proposed rule, see
generally Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush
Administration, 34 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,485 (2004); O'Neill, Mercury Risk, and Justice, supra note
22. EPA's Office of the Inspector General criticized the proposed MACT standard as "anemic."
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF MERCURY
EMISSIONS NEEDED BEFORE EPA FINALIZES RULES FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, REP. NO.
2005-P-00003, at "At a Glance" & 11-16 (2005), available at http://www.epagov/oigearth/
reports/2005/20050203-2005-P-00003.pdf.
Evidence indicates that EPA senior management instructed EPA staff to develop a
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard for mercury that would
result in national emissions of 34 tons annually, instead of basing the standard on an
unbiased determination of what the top performing units were achieving in practice....
[T]he standard likely underestimates the average amount of mercury emissions
reductions achieved by the top performing 12 percent of utilities, the minimum level for
a MACT standard required by the Clean Air Act.
Id. at "At a Glance."
39 U.S. ENVrL PROT. AGENCY, METHODOLOGY TO GENERATE DEPOSITION, FISH TISSUE
METHYLMERCURY CONCENTRATIONS, AND EXPOSURES FOR DETERMINING EFFECTIVENESS OF UTILITY
EMISSION CONTROLS 3, tbls.1.1 & 1.2 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/
eff_fnltsd-031705_corroar-2002-0056-6301.pdf [hereinafter EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS
TSD] (providing figures for emissions reductions presented in kg/yr; author's conversions).
According to EPA's models, under CAMR in 2020, total national mercury emissions will be
approximately 25 tons. This amounts to a 48% reduction from 1999 baseline emissions of
approximately 48 tons. Id.
40 See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: AN ANALYSIS
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too, that the cap-and-trade program, issued as it was under the auspices of
Section 111, makes no provision for addressing any residual risk to human
health or the environment, as would be required under section 112.
EPA announced the final CAMR with some fanfare, heralding it as the
"first ever federal rule to permanently cap and reduce mercury emissions
from coal-fired power plants"4 ' and citing the fact that "[w]hen fully
implemented, [the rule] will reduce utility emissions of mercury from 48 tons
a year to 15 tons, a reduction of 70%."42 However, many did not share EPA's
enthusiasm for the final CAMR. Those affected decried the fact that
emissions reductions would be greatly diminished and delayed relative to
the reductions attainable under a section 112 MACT-based approach, leaving
them exposed for years to come. Critics pointed to a rulemaking process
that had been highly politicized, marred by procedural irregularities and
reversals-of-course on EPA's part.'4 Congress issued a rare request for
reconsideration. State after state declined to participate in EPA's cap-and-
trade program, calling instead for more meaningful and immediate
reductions within their borders. Ultimately, several states, tribes, and
environmental groups sued the EPA.
The harms of mercury contamination are visited overwhelmingly on
various tribes and their members, particularly the fishing peoples of the
Great Lakes, the Northeast, and the Pacific Northwest. EPA was aware of
this fact as it embarked upon its efforts to regulate mercury. EPA
acknowledged early on, in its Preamble to the proposed rule, that
[s]ome subpopulations in the U.S., such as: Native Americans, Southeast Asian
Americans, and lower income subsistence fishers, may rely on fish as a primary
source of nutrition and/or for cultural practices. Therefore, they consume
larger amounts of fish than the general population and may be at a greater risk
to the adverse health effects from Hg due to increased exposure.
44
OF EPA'S CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATIONS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS 7 (updated Jan. 13, 2006) (noting that "[ilt appears that full compliance with the 70%
reduction might be delayed until 2030"). McCarthy further comments that
EPA has not provided an estimate of the year in which the 70% reduction will be
attained. The Integrated Planning Model, which the agency uses to calculate regulatory
impacts, runs to the year 2030 and assumes that all allowances will be used by the end
date. Discussions we held with EPA staff indicate that some think the allowances will be
used more quickly (perhaps as early as 2025), while others think use of allowances will
be stretched into the 2030s.
Id. at 7 n.24.
41 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Air Mercury Rule: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/
air/mercuryrule/basic.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
42 Id Note that here and elsewhere in public documents, EPA assiduously avoided the claim
that the 70% emissions reductions would in fact be achieved by the advertised date, 2018,
instead shrewdly skirting the question by using the phrase "when fully implemented." Id
43 STEINZOR, supra note 35, at 103-25 (recounting numerous irregularities and abrupt
changes in the course of mercury rulemaking at EPA).
44 EPA, Proposed Mercury Rule, supra note 5, at 4709.
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EPA should therefore have been aware of the unique constellation of
legal obligations and normative considerations that governed its work. While
EPA purported to consider environmental justice in the CAMR rulemaking,
EPA's account reveals a misunderstanding of what it would mean to
evaluate and respond to the particular issues raised by the tribal context.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE TRIBAL CONTEXT
Environmental agencies' decisions must be different when tribes and
their members are among those affected. Environmental justice in the tribal
context cannot be' contemplated apart from a recognition of tribes' unique
legal and political status.45 As well, environmental justice in the tribal
context cannot be contemplated without appreciating that environmental
contamination will often have impacts on a tribe and its members that are
not only different in degree but also different in kind from the impacts
experienced by the general population or even by other highly exposed
groups. These claims should not be unfamiliar to EPA, stemming as they do
from longstanding relationships and rights. EPA should thus have been alert,
as it contemplated mercury contamination and regulation, to the different
orientation that its work needed to take.
A. Tribes' Unique Legal and Political Circumstances
American Indian tribes are sovereign entities. Tribes comprise distinct,
self-governing peoples. Given their sovereign status, tribes are viewed as
possessing certain inherent rights. Among the attributes of sovereignty,
enjoyed by Indian tribes as by other nations, is the power to enter into
treaties: "[tihe very term 'nation,' so generally applied to [American Indian
tribes], means 'a people who are distinct from others.' The
constitution... admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties."4" The very existence, then, of the treaties between the
United States and the various fishing tribes is an affirmation of the inherent,
pre-existing rights in each sovereign treating party.
By means of the treaties, the fishing tribes ceded vast expanses of their
aboriginal lands to the United States but secured in return a guarantee that
their right to catch and consume fish would be protected in perpetuity.47 For
45 See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, Dimensions of Envizonmental Justice in Indian Country and
Native Alaska, SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT
RESOURCE PAPER SERIES 1 (2002), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20040710044504/
http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/summit2/lndianCountry.pdf; Jana L. Walker et al., A Closer Look at
Environmental Justice in Indian Country, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUSTICE 379, 379 (2002); JAMES M.
GRIJALVA, CLOSING THE CIRCLE: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE I1 INDIAN COUNTRY 4 (2008).
46 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
47 For those tribes that entered into treaties, the historical record from both sides is very
clear on the point that protection of the tribes' pre-existing fishing rights was crucial to
obtaining the tribes' assent to the treaties. As courts have observed in the course of interpreting
similar fishing clauses in the 1855 treaties between the Pacific Northwest tribes and the United
States:
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example, the Treaty of 1837, between the Lake Superior Chippewa and the
United States, provides: "The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the
wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory
ceded, is guaranteed to the Indians .. .."I In Lac Comrte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v Wisconsin (Lac Courte Oreilles), the
court explained that, by dint of the 1837 and 1842 treaties, the Chippewa
were
guaranteed the right to make a moderate living off the land and from the waters
in and abutting the ceded territory and throughout that territory by engaging in
hunting, fishing, and gathering as they had in the past and by consuming the
fruits of that hunting, fishing, and gathering, or by trading the fruits of that
activity for goods they could use and consume in realizing that moderate
living.
49
As the court there recognized, the treaty protectibns include not only
tribal members' right to fish in the ceded area, but also their right to
consume the fish they catch or to sell it to others for others' consumption.
From the perspectives of the Native peoples, the treaties were viewed as
sacred. They were revered as sovereign compacts, as charters for respectful
co-existence.50 From the perspective of the United States, the treaties were
considered the "supreme law of the land"51 under the Constitution. The lands
ceded by the tribes under the treaties contributed immensely to the wealth
and prosperity of the young United States and its citizens.52 It did not take
Governor Stevens and his associates were well aware of the 'sense' in which the Indians
were likely to view assurances regarding their fishing rights. During the negotiations, the
vital importance of the fish to the Indians was repeatedly emphasized by both sides, and
the Governor's promises that the treaties would protect that source of food and
commerce were crucial in obtaining the Indians' assent.
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979).
Some tribes' rights to fish are not secured by treaty, but instead protected by executive orders
and other federal laws. See, e.g., Parravano v. Babbit, 70 F.3d 539, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1995).
48 Treaty with the Chippewas art. V, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536. See also Treaty with the
Chippewas art. II, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat. 592.
49 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
50 See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., LINICNG ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAw AND PEACE, 1600-1800, at 47-48 (1997).
51 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 531.
52 See, e.g., Lynda V. Mapes, Culverts Add Obstacles to Salmon, State, Politics, SEATTLE
TMEs, Jan. 24, 2008, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.comhtml/localnews/
2004142062_culverts24m.html. Mapes reports that while tribes' treaty rights were recently
reiterated in court, the State of Washington (Defendant) highlights the large costs of fixing
culverts that block habitat and deplete salmon populations. Id. She cites Billy Frank Jr., "a
Nisqually tribal elder and chairman of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission":
Frank, for one, likes to remind people that amid all the grumbling about the costs of
fixing culverts and rebuilding salmon runs, non-Indians enjoy uncountable economic
prosperity from the lands the tribes gave up in the treaties so long ago. In fighting to get
the culverts fixed, tribes are simply seeking their part of the bargain, Frank said.
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long, however, for the treaty promises to be violated by non-Indians. Professor
Bill Rodgers recounts:
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the fishing grounds were quickly
enclosed.... In hundreds of confrontations, the Indians met owners who hadn't
heard of the fishing 'servitude' or who didn't believe in it; who knew for sure
that access was not here, but over there; who would let the gates down for only
a small and reasonable fee; who would insist the fishery was a private one;...
The Indians would be introduced to fences and road closures and padlocks and
abutments and signs and guard dogs and firearms that were among the
pleasures of all fee-simple property owners.... Litigation would begin in 1884,
and in a fundamental sense, it would never end. Treaty fishing lawsuits
continue today into the 21st century.
53
But the United States courts, over time, have continued to affirm the
various facets of the treaty guarantees. First, courts have emphasized that,
by means of the treaties, tribes ceded certain rights, but that all those rights
not expressly relinquished by the tribes were retained. The treaty exchanges,
therefore, represent "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights
from them-a reservation of those not granted." 4 Second, courts have
stated that the tribes' fishing rights differ from those of non-Indians: "The
treaty clauses regarding off-reservation fishing... secured to the Indians'
rights, privileges and immunities distinct from those of other citizens."
55
Third, courts have affirmed that tribes' fishing rights are permanent. 6
Although circumstances surrounding the fishery resource may change, the
right itself is not as a consequence relinquished or diminished. "The passage
of time and the changed conditions affecting the water courses and the
fishery resources [in areas governed by the treaties] have not eroded and
cannot erode the right secured by the treaties.. .. "51 Fourth, courts have
53 WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY 25 (2005).
54 U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (emphasis added). Professor Rodgers elaborates:
These treaty rights gave the Indians nothing they did not already have. The treaties
reserve places, opportunities, and practices they had long enjoyed. The Governor might
as well have acknowledged the Indians' right to breathe the air or to enjoy the sunrise.
But the treaties placed a protective property shell around what the Indians called 'their
places' and 'their fishing.'
RODGERS JR., supra note 53, at 24.
55 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974); see also Lac Courte
Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1987) ("Plaintiffs enjoy greater rights
to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory than do non-Indians.").
56 The record is also clear on the point that the treaties were understood to guarantee rights
that are permanent and not susceptible to erosion over time. Again, courts have observed:
It is absolutely clear, as Governor Stevens himself said, that neither he nor the Indians
intended that the latter "should be excluded from their ancient fisheries," and it is
accordingly inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to authorize the settlers
to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish.
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)
(citation omitted).
57 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Butsee Lac Courte
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recognized that both parties to the treaty and their successors have ongoing
obligations regarding the health of the fishery resource. "[N]either the treaty
Indians nor the state... may permit the subject matter of these treaties to be
destroyed."18 Additionally, courts have clarified that these treaty-protected
rights to fish cannot simply be balanced away by competing interests or
otherwise "qualified by any action of the state... except as authorized by
Congress."59 And, while Congress is empowered, from the perspective of the
United States, to abrogate treaties, it must do so explicitly, and will not be
taken to have done so implicitly.
Tribes' unique legal and political status also finds expression in the
doctrine of the federal trust responsibility.' This unique status is also
apparent in executive commitments, including Executive Order 13,175,
which requires consultation with tribes on a "government-to-government"
basis whenever federal agencies' actions significantly or uniquely affect
tribal interests,6 1 and in EPA's Indian Policy, which recognizes "the right of
tribes as sovereign governments to self-determination."62
A tribe, importantly, is not merely a "subpopulation," differentiated only
by its members' different susceptibilities, exposures, or vulnerabilities. No
other subpopulation comprises a people, as that term is used in the Law of
Nations.' No other subpopulation is a sovereign entity, engaged in political
and cultural self-determination, with rights to and management authority
over tribal lands and resources. No other subpopulation stands in a
government-to-government relationship with the United States.
By sheer force of logic, if the fish to which tribes have rights are
permitted to become so contaminated as to be unfit for human consumption,
the treaty-guaranteed right of fishing and the concomitant right of
"consuming the fruits of that.., fishing" or "trading the fruits of that
activity" are greatly compromised.'4 Yet these treaty rights have not been
Orielles, 760 F.2d at 182 (noting that a specific treaty right may be temporarily limited with
respect to a given parcel of land when it passes into private ownership); see also Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188 (1999) (noting the Seventh Circuit's
holding that the Chippewa retained their usufructuary rights was consistent with the decision in
Lac Courte Onielles).
58 United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975).
59 United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 281 (W.D. Mich. 1979) ("[T]he right of
the... tribes to fish in ceded waters of the Great Lakes is... distinct from the rights and
privileges held by non-Indians and may not be qualified by any action of the state.., except as
authorized by Congress.").
60 See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 226 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982) (explaining that the trust responsibility elaborates a standard of conduct for the
federal government vis-A-vis American Indian tribes, imposing a duty of the "most exacting
fiduciary" (citing Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942))); see also O'Neill, Mercury,
Risk, and Justice, supra note 22, at 11,113 (discussing the federal trust responsibility in the
context of EPA's mercury regulation).
61 See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249-50 (Nov. 9, 2000).
62 Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson to All EPA Employees (Sept. 26, 2005), available
at http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/reaffmnation-indian-policy.pdf (reaffuming EPA Indian
Policy).
63 See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-26 (2004).
64 A similar logic supported the district court's finding in the second phase of United States
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abrogated by Congress and EPA is not empowered to abrogate them of its
own accord.65 Nor can EPA simply ignore these rights or fail to notice the
impact of its decisions-decisions authorizing contamination of the fish-on
tribes' ability to exercise these rights.
B. Impacts to Tribes: Different in Degree, Different in Kind
American Indian tribes and their members often experience impacts
from environmental contamination that are not only different in degree but
also different in ind from the impacts felt by those in the general population
or other subpopulations. As Dean Suagee explains:
[I]f you look closely you are bound to find impacts that affect tribal people
differently from the way they affect other groups. Any activity that affects the
environment has the potential to cause impacts on a tribal community that are
different from impacts suffered by other communities because of the ways in
which the natural world is important to tribes for cultural and religious
reasons.... Some tribes, and some people within any given tribe, are more
dependent than others on traditional cultural practices for their basic survival
needs. Traditional religions have more practitioners in some tribes than in
others. But for all American Indian and Alaska Native people, traditional
cultural and religious practices are an important aspect of tribal identity.
Impacts on culturally important biological communities or sacred places are
bound to affect tribal communities differently.
66
From the perspectives of the fishing tribes, the harms of mercury
contamination are many and interrelated. These harms include adverse
impacts to tribal members that have physical, psychological, social,
economic, cultural, spiritual, and political dimensions. The harms to human
health are understood to be bound up with the harms to ecological health.
v. Washington, which interpreted the treaties guaranteeing to the fishing tribes in the Pacific
Northwest the right "to take fish." United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash.
1980) (Phase II), vacated by United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). There,
the court reasoned that "implicitly incorporated in the treaties' fishing clause is the right to have
the fishery habitat protected from man-made despoliation .... The most fundamental
prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken." Id at 203.
While this opinion was vacated on what were essentially procedural grounds, its unassailable
logic remained available to EPA in its deliberations. Since EPA's issuance of the final CAMR,
note, the district court has reiterated this understanding, in the particular context of the state's
duty to refrain from diminishing fish runs by constructing or maintaining culverts that block
fish passage. United States v. Washington, No. 9213RSM, slip op. at 11 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(Subproceeding 01-01) (finding that the treaty negotiators "specifically assured the Indians that
they would have access to their normal food supplies now and in the future" and that "[t]hese
assurances would only be meaningful if they carried the implied promise that neither the
negotiators nor their successors would take actions that would significantly degrade the
resource.").
65 See Final Brief of Petitioners Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians and Treaty Tribes at 25, New
Jersey v EPA, No. 05-1097 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2007) (quoting George E. Warren v. EPA, 159 F.3d
616, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
66 Suagee, supra note 45, at 7.
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The affront, moreover, is not only to the health of individual tribal members,
but also to the well-being of the group.
For the fishing tribes of the Great Lakes, as for fishing peoples
elsewhere, the lifeways associated with fish are central to their identities as
peoples. For the Ojibwe peoples,67 for example, fish, fishing, and fish
consumption all function to ensure the health of their members and the
existence of the fishery resource itself.' Indeed, the Ojibwe peoples
understand themselves to have a responsibility to continue to fish and to
consume fish in order to maintain the health of the resource and the health
of the environment more generally.69 Fishing and fish consumption are
integral components of the traditional and ceremonial activities at the heart
of Ojibwe culture.70 Ojibwe peoples depend on fish for subsistence.71 Fish
such as walleye are a staple food and fishers can feed their families or sell
their fish as a means of securing income.72 Fishing and eating fish provide
important occasions for the intergenerational transfer of knowledge
(including ecological, historical, and social knowledge) that forms a central
part of the inheritance of each succeeding generation.73 Fishing and eating
fish are also important to tribes' ability to exercise fully their treaty rights
and engage in cultural self-determination.
74
As pointed out by tribes and other environmental justice advocates,
there are numerous difficulties with the way environmental agencies
evaluate and respond to environmental contamination. First and
fundamentally, the narrow focus by agencies on the harms to individual
67 The terms Ojibwe, Chippewa, and Anishinaabe are used interchangeably in this Article.
See GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH & WILDLIFE COMM'N, A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING OJIBwE TREATY
RIGHTS (2005), available at http://glifwc.org/publications/TreatyRights.pdf. GLIFWC explains
that "[tihere are several terms used in reference to the Ojibwe people [including] ... the term
Ojibwe and its plural form, Ojibweg .... The Ojibwe people often call themselves Anishinaabe
(Anishinaabeg, plural) which in their language means Indian person or original people. An
anglicized term for Ojibweg commonly used is Chippewa." Id. at 3 n.1.
68 See, e.g., Letter from GLIFWC to EPA, supra note 3, at 2.
69 Id
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Comments on the
Proposed CAMR, supra note 1, at 1 (enumerating various local fish species "which make up a
significant subsistence resource for the 1200 Tribal members living on the Reservation and in
the surrounding area"); The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA, supra note 2, at 1
(observing that "some Tribal members eat fish because they are remotely located and fish is the
major food source available to them. All Tribal members eat fish because it is our culture and
tradition.").
72 See, e.g, Sue Erickson, 2004 Treaty Spearing and Netting Season Fast and Flrious,
MAzINA'IGAN 1 (2004), available at http'J/www.glitwc.org/publications/mazinaigan/summer2004.pdf
[hereinafter GLIFWC, 2004 Treaty Season] (reporting that "2004 provided ample fish for tribal
tables and freezers").
73 Id.; See, e.g., Sue Erickson, Doing It Right: A Boy, His Teachings and His Net MAZINA'IGAN
12-13 (2004), available at http://www.glitwc.org/publications/mazinaigan/sununer2004.pdf
(illustrating how the Ojibwe teach younger generations the tribal values associated with
fishing).
74 See generally Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Seff-Determination: The Makah Indian
Tribe Goes Whaing, 25 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 165, 167 (2000-2001) (emphasizing the importance of
treaty-secured fishing and whaling rights to tribal identity).
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humans' physiological health is at odds with tribes' understandings of what
is at stake.
Second, even within this narrowly framed inquiry, agencies' attempts to
assess exposure often fail accurately to reflect the circumstances of tribes
and their members, including their particular vulnerabilities. Fishing peoples
consume fish at greater rates than the general population. Whereas the EPA
currently recommends a default fish consumption rate for the general
population of 17.5 grams per day (roughly one fish meal every two weeks),
75
contemporary consumption rates for tribal members are several times this
rate. A 1993 survey of tribal spearers conducted by the Great Lakes Indian
Fish and Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC), for example, found that those
consuming an average number of walleye meals in the spring (the season of
highest consumption) had intake rates ranging from 189.6 grams/day to 393.8
grams/day.7" Further, seasonal and cultural constraints-including increased
fish intake as a part of ceremonies or traditional gatherings-affect tribal
consumption patterns in ways that do not affect most members of the
general population.77 The potential for acute or "bolus" doses during periods
of especially high tribal consumption is a particular issue for methylmercury,
given that exposure during crucial developmental windows can irreversibly
damage the nervous system of a fetus or growing child.' Additionally,
because the concentration of methylmercury present in fish tissue differs
from species to species, the fact that some tribes consume highly
contaminated species such as walleye, muskellunge, northern pike, and lake
trout results in greater exposures. Moreover, contemporary fish
consumption rates are distorted due to suppression effects. As the National
Environmental Justice Advisory Council explains:
A "suppression effect" occurs when a fish consumption rate (FCR) for a given
population, group, or tribe reflects a current level of consumption that is
artificially diminished from an appropriate baseline level of consumption for
75 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PA, METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING AMBIENT WATER QUALITY
CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH 4-25 to 4-27 (2000), available at
http://www.epa gov/waterscience/criteria/humanhealth/method/complete.pdf.
76 See Memorandum from Nel Kmiecik, Biological Services Director & Hock H. Ngu, Data
Analyst, Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, to Voight Intertribal Task Force
attachment 2, at 2 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Memorandum from Neil Kmiecik] (on file with
author). The corresponding average number of walleye meals in the fall (the season of lowest
consumption) ranged from 115.8 grams/day to 240.7 grams/day. Id This survey produced ranges
rather than point values, because it collected data in terms of meals per week and data'
regarding the average meal size, which it found to range from 13 to 27 ounces per meal. Id. at 1.
Note, too, that survey respondents considered an average meal to be much greater than that
assumed by EPA (generally 6 to 8 ounces). And, of course, because this survey considers only
walleye consumption; tribal members' total fish intake from all species is likely greater and
would suggest a higher contemporary fish consumption rate.
77 Seeid. at 1.
78 See Philippe Grandjean et al., The Faroes Statement Human Health Effects of
Developmental Exposure to Chemicals in Our Environmen4 102 BASIC & CLINICAL
PHARMOCOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 73 (2007), available at http://www.ncrlc.com/1-pfd-files/
faroes statement.pdf.
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that population, group, or tribe. The more robust baseline level of consumption
is suppressed, inasmuch as it does not get captured by the FCR.
79
Contemporary tribal rates are suppressed from the original, treaty-
secured rates for fishing peoples. Suppression in this context is a
consequence of "depletion and contamination of the fisheries, inundation of
fishing places, and denial of access to aboriginal lands," as well as years of
prosecution, intimidation, and gear confiscation."0
Third, agencies' increasing reliance on risk avoidance rather than risk
reduction in their efforts to address contamination likely burdens tribes and
their members disproportionately.81 Tribal people are not only the ones who
will be disproportionately affected by reliance on fish consumption
advisories, but they are likely to experience differently the nature of the
burden imposed when they are asked to decrease or eliminate their intake of
fish. Tribes and their members may be especially troubled, for example, by
the failure of risk avoidance measures to address the harms that
contamination visits on non-human species, such as loons and mink, who
obviously cannot read fish consumption advisories. 2 Tribal.people are also
less likely to "comply" with fish consumption advisories, given the profound
loss this would occasion; indeed, many in the fishing tribes may feel it is
simply impossible to give up fish or alter their lifeways.8 And some tribes
and their members may be particularly concerned about the risks that would
be introduced by following fish consumption advisories, given the role of
fish in their traditional diet.
8 4
EPA has committed to an understanding of environmental justice that is
sensitive to the particular circumstances of each affected group, including
tribes and their members. Executive Order 12,898, entitled Federal Actions
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
79 NAT'L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, FISH CONSUMPTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE 43 (2002), available at http://www.epagov/oecaerth/resources/publicationsej/nejac/fish-
consump-report_1102.pdf.
80 See generally Catherine A. O'Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest: The Right to Catch and
Consume Fish, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 131, 135 (2007). For evidence of the role of non-Indians in
undermining the exercise of tribes' treaty rights, including through prosecution and
intimidation, see, for example, JOSEPH C. DUPRIS ET AL., THE SI'LAILO WAY: INDIANS, SALMON AND
LAW ON THE COLUMBIA RIVER (2006); Fronda Woods, Who's In Charge ofFshing 106 OR. HIST.
Q. 412 (2005), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ohq/106.3/woods.html.
81 See Catherine A. O'Neill, No Mud Pies: Risk Avoidance as Risk Regulation, 31 VT. L. REV.
273, 274 (2007) [hereinafter O'Neill, No Mud Pies]; Catherine A. O'Neill, Risk Avoidance,
Cultural Discrimination, and Environmental Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,
2-3 (2003).
82 See, e.g., The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA, supra note 2; O'Neill, No Mud
Pies, supra note 81, at 307-08 (discussing problems with a narrow "myopic" approach to risk
avoidance focused solely on human health effects).
83 See O'Neill, No Mud Pies, supra note 81, at 312-16 (citing a recent survey by the Great
Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission showing "that whereas 57% of tribal fishers were
aware of mercury advisories for walleye-an important species for tribal fishers and their
families--only 9% had ever refused to eat walleye in a group setting such as a feast or a
ceremonial gathering").
84 See id, at 318-19.
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Populations, directs EPA to address environmental justice in administering
its programs."5 This Executive Order speaks to tribes' concerns alongside,
but separately from, other affected groups.8 " EPA has also requested
information to allow it better to comprehend tribes' unique perspectives on
environmental justice, and tribes and other environmental justice advocates,
including the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, have
labored to advise EPA in this respect.
In its work on the CAMR, EPA acknowledged from the outset that
tribes are chief among those affected by mercury contamination left
unaddressed.8 7 And, as noted above, numerous tribes and tribal associations
continued to remind EPA of this fact throughout the rulemaking process by
various means. 8 EPA should have been cognizant of its obligations
stemming from tribes' unique legal and political status. EPA should also
have been aware of the particular implications for environmental justice in
the tribal context, having been educated by tribes and environmental justice
advocates prior to and during the rulemaking process.
IV. EPA'S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE
EPA discussed the environmental justice issues relevant to tribes and
their members in the portions of the Preamble to the final CAMR that
explain EPA's compliance with Executive Orders 13,175 and 12,898, which
address, respectively, consultation with tribal governments and
environmental justice. This discussion is supported in turn by a host of
technical documents, including the Effectiveness Technical Support
Document (TSD) 9 and the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA).° ° Specifically,
the TSD and the RIA each took up some of the issues relevant to an inquiry
85 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
86 Id at 7632.
87 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,641.
88 See, e.g, The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA, supra note 2.
89 EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supra note 39, at 50-53 (demonstrating that subsistence
fishers are exposed to methylmercury at higher levels than recreational anglers). Note that, in the
course of reconsidering the CAMR, EPA varied some of the assumptions in its revised
Effectiveness TSDs relevant to its analysis of the human health impacts to tribal members. See
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLC COMMENTS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO:
REVISION OF DECEMBER 2000 REGULATORY FINDING ON THE EMISSIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS
FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS AND THE REMOVAL OF COAL- AND OL, FIRED
ELECTRIC STEAM GENERATING UNITS FROM THE SECTION 112(c) LIST AND STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE FOR NEW AND EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING
UNITS 70-77 (2006), available at http//www.epagov/ttn/atw/utility/final-com-resp_053106.pdf
[hereinafter RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC CoMMENTs]. The methods and conclusions,
however, are essentially the same, and the discussion herein relies on the original analysis
contained in the revised Effectiveness TSD, given that this is the analysis on which EPA
appeared to rely in its discussion of its compliance with Executive Order 12,898 in the Final
CAMR.
90 OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE FINAL REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.epagov/tt/atw/utility/ria-fmal.pdf [hereinafter EPA, CAMR RIA].
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into the disproportionate burdens of mercury contamination, although each
employed quite different methods and assumptions.
The TSD described EPA's methods for estimating the effect of CAMR
on human health. To this end, the TSD considered the portion of various
populations that would be left exposed to unsafe levels of methylmercury
under CAMR in 2020 (after accounting for the implementation of CAIR), due
to utility-attributable emissions alone. In its TSD, EPA constructed an "index
of daily intake (IDI)" to account for the "incremental exposure" due solely to
coal-fired utilities. As EPA explained, "[t]he IDI is defined so that an IDI of 1
is equal to an incremental exposure equal to the RfD level."9 EPA then
considered whether those consuming fish at levels representative of the
general population or of Native American populations would be left exposed
above this IDI, assuming varying degrees of methylmercury contamination in
the fish species consumed.
The RIA comprised EPA's assessment of the costs and benefits of the
CAMR. Specifically, the RIA attempted to quantify the "benefits" of the
CAMR in terms of the change in IQ decrements suffered by humans exposed
in utero to mercury in recreationally caught freshwater fish from U.S. waters
that EPA deemed attributable solely to utility emissions (after accounting
for the implementation of CAIR). 2 EPA tallied these benefits by estimating
the present value of the lifetime loss in earnings attributable to each point
decrease in IQ, less the amount saved in educational costs avoided for each
point decrease in IQ. By this method, EPA arrived at a value for each IQ
point lost of $8807.9' EPA applied this method to the general population, as
well as to "potentially high risk subpopulations," including one represented
by a case study of Chippewa in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan.9 EPA
also conducted a "sensitivity analysis," in which it employed higher fish
consumption rates to characterize the exposure for this group.95
EPA found that Native Americans are among those disproportionately
impacted by mercury contamination, but offered, somewhat vaguely, that
"[t]he CAMR is expected to reduce exposures to these populations." 6
Although EPA never reconciled the different approaches and assumptions in
its TSD and RIA, it referenced the latter in support of this conclusion. Thus,
91 EPA, CAMR-EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supr note 39, at 44.
92 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,641. Note that EPA allowed, additionally, that the
controls installed to reduce mercury under the CAMR could be expected to result in a slight
reduction in emissions of fine particulate matter (PM2,.,), saving up to seven lives annually, for
monetized benefits of $1.4 million to $40 million per year. EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 12-
1, 12-7 to 12-8.
93 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-46 to 10-47 (in 1999 dollars, assuming a 396 discount
rate; if one were to use a 7% discount rate, the figure would be $1580 per IQ point). Note that
EPA assumed that these benefits would not accrue until 10 to 20 years after the year 2020, given
the lag in time that it estimated between the mercury emissions reductions required by CAMR
and the expected environmental response, namely the reduction in fish tissue methylmercury
(EPA also offered alternative scenarios considering lags as short as 5 years and as long as 50
years). Id at tbl.10-28.
94 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-104.
95 Id. at 10-130.
96 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,648.
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EPA explained, it determined that the group represented by its case study of
Chippewa in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan would accrue total benefits
of $6300 to $6700 due to the CAMR.9 7 EPA elaborated that, even under the
assumptions employed in its sensitivity analysis, "Native American
subsistence populations (and other high fish consuming populations) might
experience relatively larger health benefits from the final rule compared
with general recreational angler [sic], [although] the absolute degree of
health benefits involved are relatively low (i.e., less than a 1.0 IQ point
change per fisher for any of the locations modeled)."'8 Thus, EPA concluded,
Native people would not be "disproportionately benefited" by the CAMR.'
EPA's environmental justice analysis is distressing in several respects.
First, EPA appears to have ignored the fact that tribes' treaty-secured rights
to fish are impacted, effectively viewing tribes as simply another highly
exposed subpopulation. Second, EPA misframed the inquiry at the heart of
its disproportionate impacts analysis, suggesting that the real environmental
justice issue was whether tribes and their members were disproportionately
benefited by the CAMR. Third, when EPA actually attempted to consider the
impacts on tribal members' health, it misrepresented the nature and extent
of the disproportionate burdens to fishing peoples. Fourth, EPA declined
even to engage the issues raised by the substantial delay in emissions
reductions afforded under the CAMR. Finally, EPA neglected, throughout its
analysis, to comprehend the ways in which the impacts of mercury
contamination on tribes and their members are different and, often, unique.
A. EPA Treated Tribes as Just Another Ilghly Exposed "Subpopulation"
EPA's analysis of the CAMR appears oblivious to the fact that tribes'
fishing rights are at stake. Indeed, it is unclear how or even whether EPA
viewed its analysis as engaging the matter of the tribes' legally protected
rights to fish. Notably, the word "treaty" appears nowhere in the Preamble to
the final CAMR, nor in any of the technical documents supporting the final
rule, including the TSD and RIA.100 Further, by the time it litigated New
97 Id EPA used similar methods to derive figures for "a case study of the Hmong (a
Southeast Asian-American population) in Minnesota and Wisconsin," arriving at total benefits of
$3300 to $3500. Id
98 Id
99 Id. EPA stated that "[tihis sensitivity analysis also provided coverage for the Hmong
population modeled for the RIA, and the conclusions cited above regarding relatively low IQ
changes (less than 1.0) can also be applied to this high fish consuming population." Id.
100 In fact, as the tribes pointed out,.the word "treaty" appears only once in the entire corpus
of EPA's decision documents, in the Response to Significant Comments. Final Brief of
Petitioners Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians and Treaty Tribes, supra note 65, at 28, New Jersey v.
EPA, No. 05-1097 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2007). Even here, EPA's response is dismissive; it defends
the CAMR's meager emissions reductions as, essentially, better for tribes' legally protected
rights to fish than the current unregulated levels of emissions. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Response to Significant Comments on the Proposed Clean Air Mercury Rule (Mar. 15, 2005),
avaidable athttp://www.epa gov/ttn/atw/utility/seclll_respcomoar-2002-0056-6206.pdf.
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Jersey v. EPA, EPA showed itself to be openly hostile to tribes' treaty-
secured rights, as it willfully mischaracterized their source and import.
As noted above, EPA recognized early on, in its Preamble to the
proposed rule, that "Native Americans... may rely on fish as a primary
source of nutrition and/or for cultural practices."'' EPA was also expressly
reminded during the public comment period of the fact that tribes' treaty-
protected fishing rights were impacted by the mercury rule. EPA was made
aware that mercury contamination threatens the tribes' treaty fisheries in
several ways.10' It impairs various physiological functions in the fish and
inhibits their ability to reproduce, ultimately causing depletion of the
fisheries resource. It inflicts harm directly on tribal members who
consume-or whose mothers consumed 1° 3-fish, in the form of neurological
and cardiovascular damage. And it renders the fish less saleable, thereby
impairing the tribes' treaty-protected rights to earn "a moderate living" by
fishing. Although the TSD and the RIA at least offered estimates of the
impact of mercury contamination on tribal members' health-albeit
inaccurate and conflicting estimates-neither said anything of the other
dimensions of the treaty-protected rights that are threatened by mercury
contamination. EPA nowhere grappled with the matter of the legal
protections afforded to tribal fishing rights.
EPA thus made a fundamental error: it treated tribes and their members
as if they were simply another highly-exposed subpopulation. EPA limited its
consideration of the relevant impacts to effects on tribal members'
physiological health, narrowly understood. As noted above, EPA's TSD
provided various estimates of the numbers of Native people who,
considering utilities' emissions alone, would be left unprotected by the
CAMR, under various assumptions about their level of fish intake and the
extent of methylmercury contamination in the species they consumed.
EPA's RIA attempted an analysis of "potentially high risk subpopulations"
and a sensitivity analysis that employed fish consumption rates purportedly
representative of contemporary tribal consumption practices. But in both
the TSD and the RIA, EPA accounted for only one facet of tribes' rights and
interests. And, in neither the TSD nor the RIA did EPA explain how its grave
conclusions respecting tribal members' health could be reconciled with the
treaty protections.
101 EPA, Proposed Mercury Rule, supra note 5, 69 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
102 Final Biief of Petitioners Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians and Treaty Tribes, supra note 65, at
21-22, New Jersey v. EPA, No. 05-1097 (citing evidence in the CAMR rulemaking docket for the
various dimensions along which mercury contamination impairs tribes' treaty rights).
103 Methylmercury has a half-life in the human body of approximately 70-80 days, with
considerable variability; thus, a woman whose methylmercury levels are elevated prior to
conceiving but who ceases consumption of contaminated fish once she learns she is pregnant
may still expose the developing fetus to unsafe levels of methylmercury that has not yet been
cleared from her system. NRC, METHYLMERCURY, supra note 11, at 50, 58-59. It is for this reason
that fish consumption advisories for mercury are directed to women of childbearing age, not
exclusively women who are pregnant. Note, too, that human breast milk is considered a route
of methylmercury excretion, such that women who nurse their children also risk exposing them
via this route. Id. at 50. Again, consumption advisories reflect this fact.
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Working within this narrow framework, EPA declined even to register
crucial qualifications stemming from tribes' particular historical and legal
circumstances. Importantly, EPA failed to engage the matter of "suppression
effects," brought to its attention in comments by the tribes and others.
Recall that a "suppression effect" in this context speaks to the fact that
surveys of contemporary consumption are likely to reflect consumption
rates that are suppressed, relative to the original, treaty-guaranteed rates of
fishing peoples."°4 As noted above, such suppression effects are largely a
consequence of actions sanctioned explicitly or implicitly by non-Indian
governments that have resulted in depletion and contamination of the
fisheries, and denial of access to traditional gathering and fishing places.
Thus, rates that describe historic, unsuppressed fish consumption levels are
necessary to understanding consumption consonant with treaty protections.
To conduct an analysis based on contemporary, suppressed rates is
effectively to limit tribes' practices in a manner that undermines their treaty-
secured rights. 105
EPA's poor understanding of tribes' rights and circumstances was
evident throughout its analysis. While EPA never did reconcile the different
approaches in its TSD and RIA on the matter of tribal exposure, EPA
disposed of the matter in its TSD with the expedient of a "visual inspection"
of a map combining tribal census tracts and modeled mercury deposition. 106
That is, after acknowledging the substantial percentage-fully 450/--of the
Native American population who would be exposed to unsafe levels of
utility-attributable mercury under CAMR (assuming fish tissue
methylmercury concentrations at the 99th percentile), EPA determined that
there was little reason for concern, because, by its reckoning, Native people
do not live in places where there will be much deposition due to utilities."0 7
This position required EPA to maintain that few Native people live in such
places as Michigan.'0 This claim is absurd, as the tribes pointed out in
104 See supra text accompanying note 79.
105 Although, to be sure, there are issues to be addressed in determining these historic fish
consumption rates, several tribes are well along in this process, and EPA could profitably have
consulted with these tribes on this important issue for treaty rights. See, e.g., STUART G. HARRIS
& BARBARA L. HARPER, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION, EXPOSURE
SCENARIO FOR CTUIR TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE LIFEWAYS 4 (2004), avaidable at
http://www.hhs.oregonstate.edu/phltribal-grant/CTUIR-Scenario.doc [hereinafter HARRIS &
HARPER]. Notably, courts conversant with tribes' treaty fishing rights have long relied on
evidence to this effect. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 380 (W.D. Dist. 1974)
(stating that Western Washington tribal members historically consumed about 500 pounds per
year (or 620 grams per day) per capita of salmon alone, supplemented by other types of fish and
shellfish, as well as other foods).
106 EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supra note 39, at 51.
107 Id See discussion infra note 137 and accompanying text.
108 According to EPA's maps, areas throughout Michigan would continue to experience
deposition due to utilities' emissions under CAMR. EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supra note
39, at 52; Final Brief for Petitioners Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians and Treaty Tribes, supra note 65,
at 41, New Jersey v. EPA, No. 05-1097 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2007). Note, too, that EPA's method
here may fail to account for more localized deposition "hot spots" throughout areas in Michigan
and elsewhere in which tribes retained rights to fish. See O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice,
supra note 22, at 11,098.
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litigation, given the fact that Michigan is home to twelve federally recognized
tribes and some 124,412 Native Americans."° Additionally, a large portion of
Michigan's inland waters and adjacent Great Lakes are subject to treaties,
which have been recognized by courts as securing to the tribes the right to
catch and consume fish.
Indeed, EPA appears to have remained confused about the nature of
mercury contamination's effects on tribal rights and about its own
obligations as a consequence throughout the rulemaking and into litigation.
In its brief in New Jersey v. EPA, EPA began its discussion of the treaties
with the blatant and offensive mischaracterization of the tribes' fishing
rights as having been "granted to numerous Tribes through treaties," rather
than having been reserved by the tribes."' EPA went on to claim that the
tribes' treaty-protected rights secure for them no different protections than
enjoyed by U.S. citizens generally-again, a misstatement of the law.' EPA
also sought to cast the tribes' treaty-based claims as relevant mainly to
mercury's impact on ecological health (which, in EPA's view, was not at
issue in the CAMR)." 2 Ultimately, EPA attempted to portray the treaty
protections as unrecognized or uncertain.
1 3
To its credit, EPA's discussion of its obligations under Executive Order
13,175 reflects an understanding of tribes' status as sovereign governments.
Specifically, EPA evidences an appreciation for tribes' unique legal and
political status for their role as one of three sovereigns with responsibilities
for environmental management within our tri-partite system of
government." 4 As such, EPA can be viewed here as affirming tribes' inherent
rights to and management authority over tribal resources."' However,
having observed that no tribe has yet sought to administer the relevant
programs under the Clean Air Act, EPA concluded that the CAMR "does not
have 'Tribal implications' as specified in EO 13,175 because it does not have
a substantial or direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes.""6 EPA's crabbed
interpretation allows for tribes' potential role as permitting authorities, in
accordance with its Tribal Authority Rule, but declines to acknowledge
other facets of tribes' rights and interests. EPA's contention that the CAMR
does not substantially or directly affect tribes is unsupportable, and
demonstrates a complete failure on the part of EPA to comprehend the
109 Final Brief for Petitioners Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians and Treaty Tribes, supra note 65, at
41, NewJersey v. EPA, No. 05-1097 (citing 2000 census data).
110 Initial Brief for Respondent U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency at 86, New Jersey v. EPA, No. 05-
1097 (May 4, 2007) (emphasis added). This characterization is obviously at odds with the U.S.
Supreme Court's finding in United States v. Winans See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
111 Initial Brief for Respondent U.S. Envtl. Prot Agency, supra note 110, at 86, NewJersey v.
EPA, No. 05-1097.
112 Id at 86-98.
113 Id.
114 See, e.g., Suagee, supra note 45, at 2.
115 But cf Darren J. Ranco, Anthropological Ass'n Meetings, Panel: Beyond TEK and
Environmental Science: Indian Nations and the Politics of Knowledge in Protecting Cultural
Resources 5-14 (Dec. 18. 2004) (discussing with example the limitations on tribal rights and
management under the EPA) (on file with author).
116 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,645.
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nature of tribes' treaty-secured rights to fish. Additionally, EPA's claim that
it had "consulted with Tribal officials in developing the final rule" is
demonstrably false, if consultation is understood in any meaningful way.
117
B. EPA Played Games with the Concern for Dispropoionate Impacts
EPA refrained the relevant inquiry to suggest that the real concern for
environmental justice was whether Native people were disproportionately
benefited by the mercury rule. Thus, EPA flatly refused to consider whether
a more stringent rule would better address the disproportionate burdens it
had identified. Worse, EPA cavalierly expressed concern that its lenient rule
might go too far to ameliorate the harms suffered by tribes and their
members and so raise issues of distributional equity.
In the Preamble to the final CAMR, EPA recognized that, in the absence
of regulation, certain groups, including "low-income and minority
populations" will disproportionately suffer adverse health effects, given their
fish consumption practices.'18 EPA further acknowledged that these
practices may have "economic, cultural, and religious" dimensions."' EPA
noted that Executive Order 12,898 requires it to "assess whether minority or
low-income populations face risks or a rate of exposure to hazards that are
significant and that 'appreciably exceed or is likely to appreciably exceed
the risk or rate to the general population....",, 2 0 EPA then stated that, "[iun
accordance with EO 12898, the Agency has considered whether the final rule
may have disproportionate negative impacts on minority or low-income
populations. " 121 EPA concluded that "[tihe Agency expects the final rule to
lead to beneficial reductions in air pollution and exposures generally with a
small negative impact through increased utility bills." 22 Thus, EPA's first
step was to reframe the question. Rather than consider whether the CAMR
goes far enough to reduce minority and low-income populations' exposures
to mercury that EPA concedes "appreciably exceed" those of the general
population, EPA pointed out that the CAMR does something. By assuming an
unregulated baseline, EPA was able to claim that these highly exposed
populations are better off with the CAMR.
EPA then turned the disproportionate impacts analysis inside-out. In
fact, continued EPA, the real issue was whether the CAMR makes these
populations too much better off.' 23 "To further examine whether high fish-
117 Id; O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 22, at 11,114 (describing EPA's
disappointing attention to its obligations to consult with tribes on a government-to-government
basis); see also The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA, supra note 2 (outlining how the
tribe's input. was completely disregarded in mercury regulations).




122 Id. EPA's attention to the potential burdens of increased utility bills on those who might
ill afford such increases, note, is perhaps the only laudable aspect of its environmental justice
analysis of the CAMR.
123 It seems that EPA is not alone in being convinced that this is the real distributive justice
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consuming (subsistence) populations might be disproportionately benefited
by the final rule (i.e., whether distributional equity is a
consideration)... EPA conducted a sensitivity analysis [using fish
consumption rates for Ojibwe in the Great Lakes region] focusing
specifically on the distributional equity issue."124 To its apparent relief, EPA's
environmental justice analysis revealed that "although Native American
subsistence populations (and other high fish consuming populations) might
experience relatively larger health benefits from the final rule compared
with general recreational anglers, the absolute degree of health benefits [in
terms of IQ decrements] are [sic] relatively low."
25
EPA's refraining of the inquiry required under Executive Order 12,898
makes a mockery of the concern for disproportionate burdens that is a
hallmark of environmental justice analysis. It displays a callousness to the
impacts on real people-impacts on human well-being with aspects both
practical and profound, given the "economic, cultural, and religious"
significance of fish that even EPA acknowledges. It also reveals EPA's
unwillingness to engage the real environmental justice question. Could more
immediate and meaningful regulation of utilities' mercury emissions
alleviate the disproportionately high exposures and the losses these entail?
EPA might defend its inquiry by arguing that the distributive
consequences of a given regulation are, in fact, relevant to an understanding
of environmental justice. That is to say, agencies ought to identify, for each
decision, to whom the benefits will accrue and on whom the burdens will
fall. This claim has appeal, at least in the abstract. But, once contextualized,
this approach becomes objectionable and, indeed, unuseful if one is
concerned with environmental justice in the real world. Crucially, this
approach redefines the relevant baseline: it ignores the current
maldistribution of environmental benefits and burdens and erases the long
history of efforts to colonize and assimilate Native peoples. If pursued
seriously, such an inquiry would always disqualify efforts to make progress
toward environmental justice by ameliorating disproportionate burdens.
C. EPA Misrepresented the Disproportionate Burden to Native People
Despite having emphasized its concern that Native people not be
disproportionately benefited by the rule, EPA did make a limited attempt to
assess the different impacts to human health experienced by highly exposed
groups, including Native peoples. Thus, in both the TSD and the RIA, EPA
offered alternative scenarios in which it accounted for fishing tribes' greater
exposure to methylmercury. These efforts, however, are hobbled in
numerous respects-many of which repeat infirmities brought to EPA's
issue in environmental policy. See, e.g., Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act
Regulation, 24 REG. 34, 37 (2001), at 34, 34 ("What we find is that better educated, wealthier
populations do experience cleaner air, but that poorer, less educated populations have
experienced a greater overall improvement in air quality between 1980 and 1998.").
124 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,648 (emphasis added).
125 Id.
[Vol. 38:495
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 520 2008
2008] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE TRIBAL CONTEXT 521
attention in the past by tribes and other environmental justice advocates.
126
Among other things, EPA employed assumptions about tribal practices that
grossly underestimate actual, contemporary exposures. As well, EPA
dismissed or mischaracterized data supplied by tribes and others that would
have permitted it to depict more accurately these tribal exposures. And EPA
declined to assess the risks of exposure to mercury in context, in a way that
would account for tribal members' particular vulnerabilities and real-world
experiences of these risks. In the end, EPA employed an array of devices to
downplay the harms to tribal members, enabling it to conclude that there
was little to be gained by regulating utilities' mercury emissions.
1. The Technical Support Document
In its TSD, EPA assembled tables that permit one to determine the
levels of utility-attributable methylmercury to which those in the general
population and in Native American populations are exposed, assuming
various degrees of contamination in the fish species consumed.127 These
tables usefully reveal just how high a percentage of the Native American
population would be left exposed at levels above EPA's RfD under CAMR
in 2020, due to utility-attributable mercury emissions alone, which, recall,
EPA expressed in terms of an IDI. Assuming fish tissue methylmercury
concentrations at the 99th percentile, an extraordinary portion-some
45 0/--of those consuming at contemporary tribal consumption rates would
be left exposed to methylmercury levels above EPA's threshold. 121 This
remarkable number presents a grave picture, in absolute terms, of the
potential impacts to tribal members' health left unaddressed by the CAMR.
Moreover, in comparative terms, the picture is similarly stark. Whereas all
those consuming fish at rates above the 55th percentile in the Native
American population will be left exposed to utility-attributable
methlymercury at levels above EPA's RfD, only those consuming fish at
rates above the 99th percentile in the general population of recreational
anglers will be similarly exposed to utility-attributable methlymercury at
levels above EPA's RfD. 129 Put another way, whereas those consuming the
most contaminated species and at the highest rates in the Native American
126 COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N, COMMENTS TO ADMINISTRATOR BROWNER ON THE
DRAFr REVISIONS TO THE METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH 8 (1999); NAT'L ENvTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NEJAC), FISH
CONSUMPTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 21-49 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliancelresources/publications/ej/nejac/fish-consumption-report_1102.pdf (hereinafter NEJAC,
FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT] (describing problems and strategies to address EPA's research
methods and risk assessment approaches in underestimating risk to Native peoples).
127 EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supra note 39, at 46-54, tbls.6.1, 6.3 & 6.4.
128 Id at 51, tbl.6.3. These values assume a scenario of highly contaminated fish, i.e.,
methylmercury contamination held at 99th percentile-a reasonable assumption for many tribal
fishers and their families, given that the species traditionally consumed are highly contaminated
(e.g., walleye, pike, and others, for the Great Lakes tribes). On these assumptions, the IDI will
be at or greater than 1 for all those consuming at or above the 55th percentile for this
population. Id
129 Id. at 46-51, tbls.6.1, 6.3.
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population will be left exposed at levels well above the EPA's RfD-these
people will experience an IDI of 6.43-those consuming comparable
species and at comparably high rates in the general population of
recreational anglers (because of lower levels of consumption compared to
tribal subsistence fishers) will be exposed to levels just at EPA's RfD-
these people will experience an IDI of 1.03.1° Thus, even on EPA's own
assumptions (which, as elaborated below, are likely to understate Native
people's actual exposures) the harms that remain unaddressed by the
CAMR are serious in absolute terms-crucially, given the threshold nature
of the pollutant at issue, above the level deemed safe by EPA. 31 And the
harms that remain unaddressed by the CAMR are disproportionate in
comparative terms.
As bleak as these figures are, EPA's TSD likely falls to capture the
true extent of the disproportionate burden. First, EPA's analysis employed
a fish consumption rate that mischaracterizes actual, contemporary
consumption practices (let alone treaty-based consumption practices).
32
In the TSD, EPA assumed a mean fish consumption rate for subsistence
Native Americans of 60 grams/day, and a 95th percentile rate of 170
grams/day.I Compare this to the rates evidenced by the GLIFWC survey,
which found those consuming an average number of walleye meals in the
spring (the season of highest consumption) had intake rates ranging from
189.6 grams/day to 393.8 grams/day.13 Second, EPA's analysis glossed over
the matter of real-world exposures for tribal people. As noted above, EPA
constructed an "index of daily intake (IDI)" to account for the "incremental
exposure" due solely to coal-fired utilities. 3 5 As EPA explained:
[tihe IDI is defined so that an IDI of 1 is equal to an incremental exposure equal
to the RfD level, recognizing that the RfD is an absolute level, while the IDI is
based on incremental exposure without regard to absolute levels. Note that an
130 Id.
131 When pressed on this point during the reconsideration process, EPA fell back on the
somewhat disingenuous (and decidedly unreassuring) claim that its RfD really does not amount
to a "bright line," above which adverse effects are certain to occur, so that even IDI values for
Native people that are 6 to 8 times that of the RfD (again, considering only utilities' emissions)
ought not be a source of concern. RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 89, at
77 (citing IDI values recalculated from the original IDI values in the Effectiveness TSD).
132 Additionally, surveys purporting to capture even contemporary tribal consumption rates
often use methods and conventions appropriate to the general population but inappropriate to
the tribal context, See, e.g, HARRIS & HARPER, supra note 105, app. 3 at 5-15; Stuart G. Harris &
Barbara L Harper, A Native American Exposure Scenario, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 789, 792 (1997);
Janie Donatuto, Environmental Specialist, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community Office of
Planning and Community Development, "Risk Assessment in the Tribal Context," Presentation
to EPA X Workshop, Seattle, WA (Sept. 27, 2007).
133 EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supra note 39, at 54, tbl.6.4.
134 Memorandum from Neil Kmiecik, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
135 This is an assumption that, to be fair, produced information relevant to the rulemaking-
although EPA should have connected its inquiry to the relevant factors per CAA § 112(c)(9),
which would, it should be noted, have entailed a broader understanding of the statutorily
relevant impacts.
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IDI value of 1 would represent an absolute exposure greater than the RfD when
background exposures are considered. 136
EPA never situated its findings respecting the incremental exposures
represented by the IDI in terms of the corresponding absolute exposures,
and the consequences for human health. Because it neglects other sources
of exposure to mercury, EPA's statement in the Preamble to the final rule to
the effect that the mercury emissions from utilities remaining prior to the
imposition of the CAMR posed no real public health threat was at the very
least misleading.137 Finally, it is unclear what relationship EPA intended
between this analysis in its TSD and the analyses in undertook in its RIA,
given that the assumptions underlying each do not match. This point goes to
the transparency and accessibility of EPA's deliberations, a concern
especially for those most affected.
EPA's only attempt to grapple with the implications of its TSD is crude
and unavailing. As noted above, when faced with its data suggesting that
some forty-five percent of the Native population will be left exposed to
-unsafe levels of methylmercury, EPA claimed that "[v]isual inspection [of
maps correlating modeled deposition with tribal census tracts] shows very
few locations where Native Americans live where there is also a high
residual deposition due to utilities."3 It is appropriate to recognize, as EPA
did, the complex chain connecting mercury emissions to human exposure
via ingestion of contaminated fish; indeed, environmental justice advocates
have often urged greater attention to the individualized or place-based
nature of exposure assessment. It is also fair to acknowledge the gaps in the
data before EPA at the time. Nonetheless, EPA relied on a crude tool to
dispose entirely of a central question for environmental justice. The large
opportunities for error with so coarse a method were in fact borne out
when, as noted above, it required EPA to maintain that Native Americans do
not live in significant numbers in places such as Michigan. EPA's method
here brings up a related point: if EPA had wanted to delve further into the
complexities of Native people's actual exposures, it should have sought the
expertise of those affected. That is, rather than making do with rough
proxies and visual inspections, it should have consulted with the tribes,
many of whom had long been gathering data regarding tribal demographics;
tribal members' consumption practices (including unique seasonal and
ceremonial consumption practices); local fish tissue methylmercury
concentrations; and the like.
2. The Regulatory Impact Assessment
In the RIA, EPA sought to quantify the costs and benefits of the CAMR,
and it is this analysis that supports EPA's discussion of Executive Order
12,898. As described above, EPA calculated the benefits of CAMR entirely in
136 EPA, CAMR EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supm note 39, at 44 (emphasis added).
137 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,606, 28,609 ("[W]e believe that after implementation
of CAIR, remaining utility emissions will not pose hazards to public health ...
138 EPA, CAMR EFFEcrIVENEss TSD, supra note 39, at 51.
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terms of the change in IQ decrements suffered by humans exposed in utero
to mercury from recreationally caught freshwater fish from U.S. waters that
EPA deemed attributable solely to utility emissions, after accounting for the
implementation of CAIR.'3 9 EPA tallied these benefits by estimating the
present value of the lifetime loss in earnings attributable to each point
decrease in IQ, less the amount saved in educational costs avoided for each
point decrease in IQ. By this method, and assuming the present value of an
IQ point decrement is $8807, EPA concluded that the incremental benefits of
the CAMR for the general population recreational angler were between
$1,700,000 and $3,000,000.14° As noted above, EPA concluded that the
incremental benefits of the case study population of Chippewa in Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Michigan were between $6300 and $6700.1" EPA also offered
a sensitivity analysis, by which means it considered issues of "distributional
equity."142 Here, EPA concluded that, even under "the most conservative
scenario" evaluated for Native American subsistence populations, the CAMR
"only produced a[n] IQ change of 0.61 points."' By comparison, for the
general population recreational angler, the CAMR was predicted to result in
a mean IQ change of 0.010 points.'4 4 As EPA observes, this is a difference of
"over an order of magnitude."145
EPA's RIA, like its TSD, likely fails to capture the true extent of the
burden of mercury contamination, and thus understates the benefits of
mercury regulation. First, EPA's analysis again employed a fish consumption
rate that mischaracterizes actual, contemporary consumption practices (let
alone treaty-based consumption practices). In the RIA, EPA assumed a mean
fish consumption rate for Chippewa populations of 20 grams/day for the
analysis of "potentially high-risk subpopulations" conducted as part of its
primary benefits analysis. 146  This number grossly underestimates
contemporary tribal exposures. Second, EPA misrepresented the data
submitted to it by tribal and other commenters. In its sensitivity analysis,
EPA assumed a fish consumption rate of 393.8 grams/day, which, it
suggested, may be near a maximum value or near a 95th percentile value for
Chippewa populations.'47 This number, EPA noted, was derived from
comments submitted in response to EPA's Notice of Data Availability
139 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
140 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-10, tbl.101(c) (comparing CAMR Option 1 relative
to 2020 Base Case with CAIR, assuming a 3% discount rate; the range represents, respectively,
values associated with assumptions of a 20- and 10-year lag).
141 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,648; see also EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-
10, tbl.10-1(c) (comparing CAMR Option 1 relative to 2020 Base Case with CAIR, assuming a 3%
discount rate; the range represents, respectively, values associated with assumptions of a 20-
and 10-year lag and is here summarized as approximately $7000).
142 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-131. See generallyid at 10-130 to 10-135 (examining
the economic benefit equity issue in the context of high fish consuming populations).
143 Id. at 10-134.
144 Id. at 10-134 n.29.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 10-113, 10-123.
147 Id. at 10-132.
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(NODA) for the CAMR. 14 Specifically, EPA reported, the comments
identified a range of consumption rates for the spring and fall spearing
seasons. However, what EPA portrayed as a maximum or 95th percentile
value from the relevant study had in fact been presented to EPA as a range
of average or mean values. 4 As a consequence, while EPA characterized its
sensitivity analysis as reflecting an unrealistic, conservative, and "near
bounding" picture of exposure, it in fact reflected a scenario that comes
closer to fishing peoples' actual average exposures.
150
Finally, and more fundamentally, although EPA appeared to base its
environmental justice analysis primarily on its RIA, the RIA's vehicle for
assessment-a cost-benefit analysis (CBA)-is ill-suited for illuminating the
relevant issues. CBA is a decisional tool that entails monetizing the costs and
benefits of a particular regulatory option. CBA is designed to enable
agencies to consider the disparate positive and negative consequences of a
regulatory decision in terms of a unitary metric-dollars-and thereby to
weigh the aggregate benefits against the costs. Scholars of regulatory
analysis have pointed to CBA's many deficiencies, in theory and in practice,
and I will not try to encapsulate the critique here. 5 ' However, one can
readily appreciate some of the limitations with EPA's choice of this lens for
its discussion of environmental justice. Among these shortcomings are
CBA's requirement that every harm to human and environmental health be
quantified and monetized, and that every effect, regardless of its nature or
who it impacts, be aggregated and compared along the unitary dollar
metric. 52 Critics also cite biases in CBA's techniques for measurement, it.-
conventions regarding the discounting of future benefits, and its assumption
that a society's well-being can be expressed as an aggregation of its
inhabitants' preference satisfaction. 15 Each of these features of the method
seems at odds with a concern for environmental justice, which counsels
agencies to evaluate decisions in a more contextualized manner, to consider
148 Id.
149 Id; see also Comments of Catherine A. O'Neill, Member Scholar, Ctr. for Progressive
Regulation (Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/
main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064800badcc (providing comments on Proposed National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the alternative, Proposed Standards
of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources, Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units: Notice of Data Availability, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,865 (Dec. 1, 2004), and incorporating by
reference documents that explicitly stated that the ranges presented were average values rather
than high-end, maximum, or "near-bounding" values from the 1993 GLIFWC study of tribal
spearers' walleye consumption).
150 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,648.
151 For an excellent general critique of the method, see FRANK ACKERMAN & IdSA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS, ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING
(2004); for a critique of the method in the specific context of the CAMR, see Catherine A.
O'Neill, in ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Harrington et al., eds.) (forthcoming,
2008); for a discussion of a pragmatic approach to remedying CBA's ills, see Sidney A. Shapiro
& Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Orientaton, HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 21-32, on file with author).
152 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151, at 35-40 (discussing the impossibility of
monetizing the priceless benefits of regulation for comparison with often-overestimated costs).
153 See, e.g., id.
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what is at stake for whom, and to attend to instances of distributive
injustice.
EPA's RIA narrowly described the universe of benefits to be
considered, focusing only on impacts to human neurodevelopmental
health. 54 Moreover, because EPA's method called for an accounting in
dollars, any benefit of reducing mercury contamination that was not
amenable to representation in monetary terms was simply unaccounted for.
With CBA, monetizability functions as a de facto criterion for consideration
at all. If an impact-such as the fraying of the social fabric of a fishing tribe
when fish, fishing, and the associated practices are no longer a part of
members' daily lives and no longer a source of the intergenerational transfer
of traditional ecological knowledge-cannot be (or has not been) monetized,
it will be entered in the ledger as a "0" value. In the case of the CAMR, the
EPA acknowledged that its benefits analysis was limited to the human health
"endpoint" of IQ decrements "because it can be monetized."155 To be sure,
EPA noted that reducing mercury would bring about additional benefits that
had not been quantified.15 But it has long been recognized that, with CBA's
bottom line available, such qualitative descriptions tend to fade from view,
while the quantitative account comes to dominate the public debate.
The requisite of monetization also opens the door for manipulation, a
particular problem when those wielding the calculator are hostile to
environmental regulation and insensitive to environmental justice. 57 Here,
the Bush EPA seems to have taken every opportunity to choose inputs and
make assumptions that minimize the dollar value of the benefits to be gained
from reducing mercury. For example, EPA opted for a low dose-response
curve to relate maternal mercury levels to IQ decrements in children
154 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Catherine A. O'Neill & Rena I. Steinzor, Ctr. For Progressive
Reform, Mercury, http://www.progressivereform.org/perspectives/mercury.cfm (last visited Apr.
13, 2008).
EPA makes several crucial cuts in its benefit calculus: it counts only benefits to human
health (and so excludes ecological health and other benefits, including, e.g., economic,
social, political, cultural and spiritual well-being for the fishing tribes), and of these
human health benefits,- it counts only neurodevelopment effects and so excludes
cardiovascular and other effects. If further winnows the benefits, by counting only
neurodevelopment effects that are captured by IQ decrements.
Id.
155 EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6, at 28,641 ("EPA determined that IQ decrements due to
Hg exposure is one endpoint that EPA should focus on for a benefit analysis, because it can be
monetized.").
156 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-1 to 10-2 (reciting, by way of disclaimer, that "the
Agency believes that the benefits presented in [the RIA] likely underestimate the total benefits
of reducing mercury emissions from power plants" due to the fact that it is "unable to quantify
several categories of potential benefits," including other human health and ecological effects).
157 EPA's RIA appears to illustrate once again the observation that CBA operates in practice
as a one-way ratchet, systematically understating the benefits of environmental and other
regulation. See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral? 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 335
(2006); ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151, at 40; Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 151,
(manuscript at 20-21, on file with author) (describing the call for "regulatory relief" as one of
the primary motivating factors behind the adoption of CBA).
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exposed in utero, one that is roughly one-third that employed by a team of
specialists in pediatric medicine."I EPA constructed an estimate of the
number of Chippewa children who will be exposed in utero, in an effort to
account for "high risk" populations, but used a census-based approach that
by its own estimate likely undercounted the exposed population "by about
50 percent."159 And, as noted above, EPA coupled this with a fish
consumption rate, 20 grams/day, that likely grossly underestimated
exposure. 160  Indeed, some of EPA's assumptions, while perhaps
unobjectionable to an economist, raise issues that would likely be
controversial to most ordinary people, let alone those concerned for
environmental justice. For example, in arriving at its exposed population
number for the Chippewa case study, EPA adjusted the general population
fertility rate downward, to reflect that fact that, whereas for the general
population there are 65.3 live births per 1000 women aged fifteen to forty-
four, for American Indians there are 58.1 live births per 1000 women. 61
Although the reasons for this differential are surely complex, it is worth
noting that to the extent that these relatively lower fertility rates reflect
poorer opportunities for American Indian women to obtain prenatal and
obstetric care, this disadvantage is effectively held against them. Because
EPA employs the relatively lower fertility rate to obtain a lower number for
the exposed population, the result is a reduced estimate of the benefits of
mercury regulation for this population. And, while EPA remedies some of
these calls in its "sensitivity analysis" by employing a greater fish
consumption rate, EPA leaves other errors intact and ultimately retains the
reductionist understanding of the harms of mercury contamination solely in
terms of IQ decrements.
Further, the RIA illustrates the problems raised by an attempt to
monetize the harms to human health and well-being from mercury
contamination. The RIA arrived at its estimate that each IQ point loss is
worth $8807 by determining the associated loss in expected future income
158 EPA ultimately assumes a relationship of -0.16 IQ points for each ppm of maternal hair
mercury. RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 89, at 111-13. In contrast, Dr.
Leonardo Trasande and his colleagues calculate a relationship of -0.465 IQ points per ppm of
maternal hair mercury. See Trasande et al., Economic Consequences of Mercury, supra note 12,
at 392; see also Charles Griffiths et al., A Note on Trasande et a., Public Health and Economic
Consequences of Methylmercury Toxicity to the Developing Brain 8 n.3 (Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl.
Econ., Working Paper No. 06-02, 2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/
ffb05b5f4a2cf40985256d2d00740681/dd32a2la7da2bdf38525715500485642/$FILE/2006-02.pdf
(while Dr. Transande and his colleagues presented the dose response curve in terms of ppb of
mercury in cord blood, this figure can be converted into ppb of mercury in hair for
comparison). Note that the EPA CAMR actually gives this figure as -0.13 IQ points per ppm
maternal hair mercury. EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 9-7. However, EPA revised its
estimate to -0.16 IQ points per ppm maternal hair mercury upon reconsideration. Griffiths et al.,
supra, at 8 (explaining that this revision came in response to public comment); see also
RESPONSE TO SIGNIFCANT PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 89, at 111-13.
159 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-120 to 10-122.
160 Id
161 Id.
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experienced by those children prenatally exposed. 16 2 While there are
practical limitations to this loss-in-earnings method, its premises are even
more troubling. This approach is reductionist and inegalitarian: it rests on a
view that a person's worth is determined by his or her earning power. As
such, it effectively values more highly those who are young, male, white, and
rich.' As Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling have argued, the
implications for public policy are highly unpalatable in a society that holds
dear the "ideals of democracy and equal treatment under the law, let alone
the sacredness of every human being."64 Moreover, as Ackerman and
Heinzerling have pointed out, a particularly egregious consequence of the
loss-in-earnings approach "is that it implies that the lives of retired people
are worth nothing-or perhaps less than nothing, since they consume scarce
goods and services without earning or producing any marketed goods
themselves."' 65 Taken to its logical conclusion, they observe, this perspective
would suggest a net social benefit to policies that kill older people.166
As repugnant as this conclusion might sound to most people, it is likely to
be even more profoundly at odds with the perspectives of the groups most
affected by mercury contamination, namely various Native peoples.'67 For
these peoples, elders are not the least valued, but among the most cherished
162 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT REVISION OF DECEMBER 2000
REGULATORY FINDING ON THE EMISSIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY
STEAM GENERATING UNITS AND THE REMOVAL OF COAL- AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM
GENERATING UNITS FROM THE SECTION 112(c) LIST: RECONSIDERATION (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/tsd-oar-2002-0056-6303.pdf.
163 See also CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW,
POLICY & REGULATION 37 (2002) ("recounting arguments of Lawrence Summers, then chief
economist for the World Bank, in favor of shifting polluting industries to less developed
countries: [tihe measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depends upon the
forgone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given
amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which
will be the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of
toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.") Id.
164 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151, at 72.
165 Id
166 Lest someone think that Professors Ackerman and Heinzerling's observation is far-
fetched and would never see the light of day in a policy context, consider that a noted
economist, W. Kip Viscusi, undertook research that concluded that states in fact saved money
when their citizens smoked. Id. Because smokers die early, states were saved the expense of
providing elder care and other services associated with an aging population. Id. This study was
undertaken at the time when the question was very much in the public realm, as states were in
litigation with the tobacco companies, seeking reimbursement for the medical costs the states
incurred as a result of smoking. Id. As Ackerman and Heinzerling note, "[a]ccording to Viscusi,
the financial benefit to the states of their citizens' premature deaths was so great that, if some of
his results were 'taken at face value,' then 'cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than
taxed.'" Id.
167 Note that this perspective seems to be largely missing from the literature debating QALYs
and similar approaches involving controversial judgments about the relative value of human life
in its various stages in which economists ask, "Is Granny Worth $2.3 Million or $6.1 Million?"
See Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Policy Matters 03-13, Is
Granny Worth $2.3 Mill'on or $6.1 Milbon9, (May 2003), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=138&printversion=I (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
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members of the community. 168 Their contributions-as holders of traditional
knowledge, custodians of cultural practices, keepers of historical records,
guardians of the youngest tribal members-are recognized as an irreplaceable
"asset" that comprises the intergenerational legacy of the tribe.169 Importantly,
elders' "value" to the tribal community comes not chiefly from market-based
employment, but from other contributions.17 ° The fact that they are not
bringing in income from the market economy is not viewed as detracting from
their value to the tribe. To the contrary, elders' ability to fulfill their role in the
community is in part enabled by the fact that they are not busy working "9 to
5" in fact, a need to participate as earners in the market economy can
compromise their ability to perform traditional duties.' 7
In the end, EPA did not need to concern itself with winnowing the
benefits and low-balling the inputs. By employing the tool of CBA in the first
place, the RIA considered the impacts in aggregate terms. The fact that there
are so few Chippewa-and so very few exposed Chippewa, by EPA's
estimate-means that, no matter how dire the effect of methylmercury for
these people in individual terms, the sum will be but a drop in the bucket. That
is, once EPA estimated that the exposed Chippewa population was only
10,947, it was not surprising that EPA concluded that the monetized benefits
of mercury regulation to even this highly exposed population were miniscule,
i.e., a mere $6300 to $6700.172 This point raises a fundamental difficulty with
CBA. CBA assumes that a nation's well-being can be expressed as an
aggregation of its inhabitants' well-being (characterized in terms of preference
satisfaction). Where what constitutes the good differs from group to group,
this focus on a mere summation of impacts will always be a problem for those
in the numerical minority. Even large harms to a group in the numerical
minority will never have much effect on the bottom line.
7 3
D. EPA Declined to Engage the Impacts of Delay
In crafting its final rule, EPA flatly refused to engage the crucial
matter of the delay in emissions reductions under the CAMR relative to a
section 112 MACT-based approach. As noted above, the CAMR instated a
168 See, e.g., SWINOMISH TRIBAL COMMUNITY, SWINOMISH TRIBAL MENTAL HEALTH PROJECT, A
GATHERING OF WISDOMS: TRIBAL MENTAL HEALTH: A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 145-63 (Swinomish
Tribal Community 1991) Examining "Tribal Family Systems" and finding that "[elIders have a
unique and honored place in Indian society" as "the teachers and carriers of tradition." Id at
154. Elders' "greater life experience, historical perspective, spiritual knowledge and closer ties
to the old ways of tribal ancestors make them a valuable resource for younger people," with
those who lack elders "considered 'poor.'" Id. at 154, 156.
169 Id. at 154.
170 Id. (For example, "[o]lder people, especially grandparents, are often the primary teachers
of children, and not infrequently are their primary care givers.").
171 See, e.g, Donatuto, supra note 132.
172 EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90, at 10-124, 10-130.
173 But e. Matthew D. Adler, Against "Tnvidual Risk: A Sympathetic Critique, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1121, 1125 (2005) (arguing for a population-risk based approach over what he takes to be
the current, individual-risk based inquiry).
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cap-and-trade program with exceptionally weak caps and lenient timelines
for compliance; according to EPA's own projections, the promised 70%
reductions in mercury emissions would not be achieved until well into the
2020s or even as late as the 2030s. This stands in stark contrast to the 90%
reductions to be achieved by 2007 expected under a MACT standard. Once
EPA embraced its cap-and-trade approach, it abandoned all efforts to
consider a MACT-based approach, rebuffed calls from numerous quarters
for more immediate and meaningful emissions reductions, and thwarted
observers' attempts to compare the CAMR with more protective
alternatives. 74 The delay in emissions reductions afforded by the CAMR
amounts to a generous reprieve to utilities. But this reprieve comes on the
backs of all those exposed to harmful levels of mercury in the meantime.
What does this delay in emissions reductions mean? According to
recent data, between 316,588 and 637,233 children are born each year with
cord blood mercury levels greater than 5.8 pg/L, a level associated with
loss of IQ. 75 Considering only this adverse impact, the failure to control
anthropogenic sources of mercury has irreversible consequences, affecting
the intelligence and prospects for each of these children throughout his or
her life. Dr. Leonardo Trasande and his colleagues have quantified the
impact of the failure to control U.S. coal-fired utilities, and concluded that
it costs $1.3 billion each year. 76 That is, they found that these costs will be
exacted each year, from the several hundred thousand children in each
new birth cohort who are exposed in utero to harmful levels of mercury-
which costs they tallied mainly in terms of loss future earnings.'77 If one
takes these figures and multiplies them by the number of years that EPA's
CAMR delays meaningful emissions reductions, one can get a sense of the
costs of delay. Assuming, generously, that the CAMR will result in
substantial reductions in mercury emissions by 2023, this represents a
delay of fifteen years relative to the compliance date for the 90%
reductions expected under a MACT-based approach in 2007. This fifteen-
year delay will visit permanent harm on millions of children-that is, all
other things being held equal, between 4,748,820 and 9,558,495 children
will be born with cord blood mercury at levels associated with a loss of IQ
during the period that utilities enjoy a reprieve from regulation. This
174 See, e.g., STEINzoR, supra note 35, at 103-25. Professor Steinzor recounts the history of
EPA's rulemaking, tracing the shift in EPA's focus away from a MACT-based approach, which
was a "foregone conclusion" until some time in the spring of 2003, when senior political
appointee Jeffery Holmstead "dropped a bombshell": he directed staff to develop a cap-and-
trade program and to halt all efforts to produce additional information on the costs, benefits,
and feasibility of various MACT options. Id at 114-15.
175 See Dr. Leonardo Trasande & Dr. Philip Landrigan, Keep Children A way From Chemicals:




177 Trasande et al., Economic Consequences ofMercury, supra note 12, at 590 (assuming that
405,881 children born each year while excluding postnatal exposures and an additional 231,352
children with fetal exposures just under 5.8, and providing a "true" range of $0.1 to $6.5 billion
each year).
[Vol. 38:495
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 530 2008
2008] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE TRIBAL CONTEXT 531
fifteen-year delay translates into $19.5 billion dollars in the form of losses
in future earnings for these children-to use the metric employed by
EPA-attributable solely to U.S. utilities' portion of mercury emissions and
exposure.7 8 While these comparisons represent a rough cut,'79 they
nonetheless provide a glimpse of the considerable costs-whether in terms
of the life prospects for our children or in terms of social utility-of
delay. 
1 0
Of course, these comparisons reflect losses on the basis of general
population data. Data more specific to affected tribes provide another
window on the unjust impacts of delay. Whereas Trasande et al. considered
a general population, and concluded that the most highly exposed 5% of
children in each birth cohort would suffer losses in IQ ranging from 1.60 to
3.21 points, researchers at the Leech Lake Tribe considered Great Lakes
tribal populations, and concluded that the average child in each birth cohort
would suffer losses in IQ ranging from 6.2 to 7.1 points because of greater
exposures entailed by the lifeways of these fishing peoples (e.g., tribal
members consume highly contaminated species of fish, at higher rates, and
at different frequencies than members of the general population; their
exposures include bolus doses, given tribal members' extraordinary intake
during certain seasons or in accordance with certain ceremonial
178 Note that no discount rate has been applied for those born in 2023 compared to 2007.
179 First, these figures calculate the benefits that would result from the complete elimination
of utility-attributable mercury emissions, which overstates both the effect of a MACT-based
approach (which would result in 9096 reductions) and the effect of the CAMR (which is
projected to result in 70% reductions). This assumption comports, however, with EPA's
assumption for its IPM runs and for its upper-bound benefits analysis, so it provides a useful
basis for comparison. Second, these figures compare benefits that would result when significant
reductions are assumed to be achieved, respectively, in 2007 and in 2023, but this simplifying
assumption does not account for the more modest reductions under the CAMR that are
predicted to occur earlier, due to the operation of the Phase I cap in 2010 and, in some models,
due to structural features of the cap-and-trade program, namely, its banking mechanism. EPA
estimates mercury emissions to be reduced by 21% in 2010 (from 48 to 38 tons). EPA, CAMR
EFFECTIVENESS TSD, supra note 39, at 1. The Congressional Research Service puts emissions
reductions at 35% in 2010 (from 48 to 31.3 tons). McCARTHY, supra note 40, at 7 tbl.2. In this
respect, these figures likely overestimate the number of children harmed by the delay. Third, as
noted above, these figures obviously represent only a partial account of the harms wrought by
delay, accounting as they do only for IQ decrements to prenatally exposed children. In this
respect, these figures underestimate the costs of delay.
180 In fact, the more recent work of Trasande et al. adds to this estimate, by calculating the
additional societal costs due to the increase in cases of mental retardation suffered by those
children exposed in utero to utility-attributable mercury emissions. Trasande and his colleagues
find that, while the CAMR will likely prevent some 1475 cases of MR and save $4.1 billion in
societal costs (due to lost economic productivity and to the costs of special education, health
care, and other costs) over the years 2005 to 2020, more immediate and stringent emissions
reductions could prevent an additional 4450 cases of MR and save an additional $13.1 billion.
Trasande et al., Cost Analyses and Mercury Policy, supra note 12. Trasande et al. evaluated
reductions on the order of 70-90%, in line with legislative proposals on the table at the time of
the CAMR. See generally EPA, Final CAMR, supra note 6 (discussing finalization of CAMR). See
also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Controlling Power Plant Emissions: Decision Process and
Chronology, http://www.epagov/mercury/control_emissions/decision.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2008) (providing a history of EPA's mercury regulation efforts).
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practices).' Native peoples in the Great Lakes and elsewhere have also
recounted numerous other costs of a delay in mercury regulation, including
impacts to tribal health along interrelated physical, social, cultural, and
spiritual dimensions." 2 The Aroostook Band of Micmacs, for example,
described these additional costs of delay in comments to the EPA,
emphasizing the permanent, intergenerational nature of the "loss of the
culture which defines our Tribe."s 3
Here, as elsewhere, the costs of delay in environmental, health, and
safety regulation are potentially large in dollar terms and unconscionable in
human terms.1 4 But there is no place in EPA's cost-benefit method to
register these costs of delay. ' 5 In fact, although EPA took pains in the
CAMR RIA to model and offer benefits figures for numerous alternative
scenarios, EPA never presented-and made it virtually impossible to
determine-a direct comparison between the regulatory alternatives under a
section 112 MACT-based approach and the section 111 cap-and-trade
approach that comprises the final CAMR. 8 6 An astute observer would be
181 The Honorable George Goggleye Jr., Chairman, Leech Lake Tribal Council, address at
International Conference on Mercury as a Global Pollutant, Madison, WI (Aug. 6, 2006); Telephone
Interview with John Persell, Leech Lake Band Department of Natural Resources (Jan. 15, 2008).
182 See, eg, GLIFWC Staff, Thba/PerSpective Shared at International Mercury Conference,
MAZINA'IGAN: A CHRONICLE OF THE LAKE SUPERIOR OJIBWE, Winter 2006-07 at 1, available at
http'//www.glifwc.org/Publications/nazinaigan/Winter2006.pdf (noting disproportionate impact on
Tnbes).
183 Aroostook Band of Micmacs, Letter to EPA, supra note 4, at 1.
184 See generaly DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNA.MIcs OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27-31
(2003) (arguing that CBA provisions in FIFRA and TSCA have produced "a conspicuous failure to
make decisions" as illustrated by "the long and unsuccessful effort to address asbestos"). Early
efforts to quantify this phenomenon highlighted the costs of delay for a single regulation. An
eleven-year delay in regulating occupational exposure to benzene, for example, was estimated to
result in some 30 to 490 excess deaths to those exposed between 1978 and 1987. William J.
Nicholson & Philip J. Landrigan, Quantitative Assessment of Lives Lost Due to Delay in the
Regulation of Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 185, 187 (1989).
185 Even proponents concede this limitation, as CBA is meant to take stock of a single option
that is on the table. See, e.g, Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 136 (Matthew D. Adler
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) ("CBA has no place for the use of practical intelligence"). But cf infa
Part IV (arguing that CBA "best practices" call for more meaningful alternatives analysis).
186 This deficiency in EPA's CAMR RIA poses a real problem for those who tout the chief virtue
of CBA as its transparency, its ability to inform public debate, and to allow the public to see why
the decision at hand is "genuinely difficult." See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetie of Atseni 90
GEO. L.J. 2255, 2259 (2002) (hereinafter Sunstein, Afithmetie. MATrHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A.
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, 156 (2006); but cf Shapiro & Schroeder,
supra note 151, at 1-5. The EPA and President Bush similarly worked to thwart informed debate
on the temporal dimensions of the regulatory options for mercury in their public statements
accompanying the CAMR. As noted above, EPA never actually stated the date by which it
projected mercury emissions would be reduced by the 7096 promised by the Phase II cap. Instead,
EPA and the President assiduously avoided the question, by citing the date of the cap, 2018, and
then, in the following sentence, saying "when fully implemented [CAMR will result in a 7096
reduction in mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities]. See, e.g., Office of the President, Cleaner
Air, http'/www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/clean-air.hml (last visited Apr 12, 2008). In a similar vein, note
this document dismisses as "myth" the argument that "EPA is delaying the benefits of mercury
regulation until 2018" and offers as "fact" the claim that "the substantial amount of emissions
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hard pressed even to ballpark this comparison.
18 7
In the context of mercury regulation, the delay permitted by EPA's
choice was of the utmost concern. Because a child exposed to mercury can
suffer lifelong, irreversible harms, and because each year of inaction meant a
new birth cohort of children would be exposed, EPA's inquiry should have
centered around not only the magnitude of the emissions reductions to be
required but also the timing of those reductions. Instead, EPA used its RIA to
obscure and preempt this issue. In fact, by discounting the benefits realized
in the future (per the conventions of CBA), EPA slighted those exposed both
coming and going. EPA made these people wait years for any protection, and
so were able to discount what that protection is worth.
Note, too, that, although the D.C. Circuit's result in New Jersey v. EPA
is to be celebrated, one consequence of the decision is that EPA will have to
return to the drawing board to produce a legally permissible rule in
accordance with section 112 of the Clean Air Act, resulting in even further
delay."8 8 At a minimum, emissions reductions will not be required until at
least three years later than originally would have been the case, during
reductions... will come in the early stages." Id.
187 EPA provided an estimate of the benefits that would result if utility-attributable mercury
emissions were to be eliminated entirely in 2001 (assuming "base case" conditions). EPA also
provided an estimate of the benefits that would result from the co-benefits to be realized in 2020
through the implementation of CAIR relative to this 2001 baseline. However, even here, EPA left
the observer to rectify several key assumptions-the most obvious of which is that EPA
presented the former estimate as a present value in 2001 and the latter estimate as a present
value in 2020. Notably, EPA did not present any estimates of the benefits that would flow from
regulation of mercury emissions relative to this 2001 baseline. Instead, EPA reset the baseline
by assuming a new "base case" as of 2020 and assuming CAIR had already been implemented.
Further, EPA presented the benefits of alternative mercury emissions reductions scenarios only
vis-t-vis this new baseline in 2020. Thus, while EPA purported to consider various control
scenarios (e.g., assuming utility-attributable mercury emissions were to be eliminated entirely
in 2020) or assuming the control scenario that actually became the final CAMR (reflected in the
RIA as "CAMR Control Option 1"), it only ran the numbers relative to its new 2020 baseline. EPA
thus never directly compared-and appeared to thwart observers' efforts to compare-
scenarios reflecting dates and emissions reductions that matched the two competing regulatory
alternatives. See generallyEPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 90.
188 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. After New Jersey v. EPA, EPA must comply
with the terms of section 112. Having listed utilities under section 112(c)(1), EPA is required to
issue MACT standards for that source category under 112(d) or to satisfy to substantial
prerequisites for de-listing, set forth in 112(c)(9). Under section 112(c)(9), EPA "may delete any
source category from the [section 112(c)(1)] list" only if it finds that "emissions from no source
in the category.., exceed a level which is adequate to protect public health with an ample
margin of safety and no adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any
source." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9) (2000). It seems doubtful that EPA would be able to meet this
high hurdle for de-listing. Observers have suggested that it is "unlikely" that EPA would seek a
rehearing en banc before the D.C. Circuit or petition the Supreme Court for certiorari give "the
unanimity and complete certainty" of the D.C. Circuit's decision. See ROBERT MELTZ & JAMES E.
McCARTHY, THE D.C. CIRcuir REJECTS EPA'S MERCURY RULES: NEW JERSEY V. EPA, CONG. RES.
SERV. REP. 4 (2008), available at www.dnr.wisconsin.gov/air/pdfICRS22817report2008228.pdf.
However, as this Article goes to press, EPA and the Utility Air Regulatory Group filed separate
petitions for rehearing before the entire D.C. Circuit. Robert C. Cook, EPA, Industry Group File
Rehearing Motions Seeking Review of Opinion in Mercury Case, BNA Daily Envtl. Rep., Mar. 27,
2008, at A-3.
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which time significant numbers of children will be born with neurological
damage and during which time mercury's other harms will be wrought l8 9 It
is perhaps not too cynical, given the history of EPA's efforts in this
rulemaking, to suggest that the Bush EPA will find solace in having bought
for utilities at least this much respite from regulation.
E. EPA Ignored Those Impacts to Tnbes that are Different in Kind
Given the identities of those most exposed, among them fishing peoples in
the Great Lakes and elsewhere, the burden of mercury contamination is not
only different in degree but also different in kind. The harms of mercury are
imposed along interrelated ecological, economic, social, cultural, spiritual, and
political dimensions, as the discussion thus far has highlighted. Although tribes
and other advocates labored to bring this fact to EPA's attention during this
rulemaking, there is simply no place in EPA's RIA that these considerations got
reflected. This criticism goes to the heart of the choice to use CBA, as there is
no place in its calculus for considerations untranslatable to the dollar metric.
As the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe urged in its comments to EPA: "For our
Tribe, the stakes are high in this fight to limit mercury emissions .... [M]ercury
is toxic and is negatively impacting many facets of the health, well-being, and
social fabric we all value .... If it is a cost and benefit question then I must ask
what profits are worth the health of our children and grandchildren?"19 °
Additionally, EPA's analysis ignores the costs-in dollar terms and in
human terms--that EPA's lenient regulation introduces. Because the CAMR
delays and diminishes mercury emissions reductions, it requires little change
from the status quo in terms of mercury contamination for years, if not
decades. In the meantime, public health agencies will be left to issue fish
consumption advisories, urging people to change their lifeways to avoid the
risks of contamination. In fact, EPA self-consciously relied on such risk
avoidance measures, given the CAMR's failure meaningfully to reduce mercury
emissions. EPA had conceded in the Preamble to its proposed mercury rule
that tribal members and others who regularly consume fish would remain at
greater risk than "the typical U.S. consumer."191 "In response," EPA directed
these people to the relevant fish consumption advisories, shifting the
responsibility to avoid the risks of mercury contamination to those most
exposed.192
189 Robert Meltz and James McCarthy have opined that, given the fact that the EPA
abandoned its earlier efforts to produce MACT standards for coal-fired utilities and given that
there have been significant advances in available control technology in the meantime,
developing MACT standards in the wake of New Jersey v. EPA will require deliberation and
potentially delay promulgation until "as late as 2011," making the effective date for such
standards 2014. MELTZ & MCCARTHY, supra note 188, at 5. They note, however, that there are
numerous bills on the table that might alter this picture, including one that would require EPA
to issue a MACT standard-one requiring 90% emissions reductions for mercury-by October 1,
2008. Id
190 The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA, supra note 2.
191 EPA, Proposed Mercury Rule, supra note 5, at 4658.
192 Id at 4709. See generally O'Neill, Mercuy, Risk, and Jdutice, supra note 22, at 11,106-12
534 . [Vol. 38:495
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But risk avoidance is an approach with its own perils. First, its myopic
focus on human health, narrowly understood, fails to account for the
broader array of harms that may be relevant from tribes' perspectives. For
example, fish consumption advisories do nothing to address the harms
suffered by loons, mink, or other non-human components of ecosystems due
to mercury contamination."3 This is an affront to tribes such as the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, which explained in comments to the EPA "if
these animals are threatened, Tribal culture is threatened." 94 Second, to the
extent that people comply with fish consumption advisories, the potential
for countervailing risks is a serious concern. The nutritional benefits of
frequent fish consumption are well known. For example, frequent
consumption of fish is associated with a lower risk of stroke, a lower risk of
Alzheimer's disease, and a decreased rate of cognitive decline with age." 5
For fishing peoples, the connection between fish consumption and health is
especially marked. The loss of fish and other traditional foods "is now
recognized as being responsible for a host of diet-related illnesses among
Native Americans, including diabetes, obesity, heart disease, tuberculosis,
hypertension, kidney troubles, and strokes."196 Diabetes is a particular
concern for tribal people given that Native Americans' incidence of diabetes
is two to three times that of all other groups combined.'9 7 The potential for
loss in economic terms may be great as well. All those who rely on fish as a
source of income or a dietary staple will suffer a real blow to their ability to
put food on the table. These and other costs of relying on risk avoidance in
lieu of risk reduction are simply not accounted for in EPA's quantitative
tally. And, of course, there are many tribal people for whom compliance with
fish consumption advisories is unimaginable, given the profound loss this
would entail.
How did EPA grapple with the "choice" its decision imposed on the
generation of girls in the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe who, in the absence of
meaningful mercury regulation, will be advised to reduce or eliminate fish
from their diets for more than half of their lives, i.e., throughout their
childhood to age twenty (during which period they are vulnerable to
neurodevelopmental toxins) and then throughout their childbearing years to
age forty-four (during which period they might expose a developing fetus to
irreversible neurological damage)? If the losses that this would entail are
understood in the terms urged by the tribes and environmental justice
(describing EPA's embrace of risk avoidance in the Proposed CAMR).
193 Note that a section 112 MACT-based approach, by contrast, would have required EPA to
address directly these and other harms to non-human components of ecosystems, given its
requirement that residual risks to human and environmental health be ameliorated. Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2000).
194 The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Letter to EPA, supra note 2.
195 See O'Neill, No MudPes, supra note 81, at nn.218-20 and accompanying text.
196 KARl MARIE NORGAARD, THE EFFEcTS OFALTERED DIET ON THE HEALTH OF THE KARUK PEOPLE:
A PRELIMINARY REPORT 5 (2004), avilable at http://klamathsalmonlibrary.org/documents/
Norgaard2004pd.pdf.
197 Ctrs. for Disease Control, Health Disparities Experienced by American Indians and
Alaska Natives, MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Aug. 1, 2003, at 697.
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advocates, decision makers might come to appreciate the multiple and
interrelated dimensions of the harms, to these girls and to their people, with
physiological, social, economic, cultural, spiritual, and political facets. If, on
the other hand, the losses that this would entail are understood in terms of
CBA, decision makers learn only that these girls will suffer a setback that is
worth $5372, in 1999 dollars-an amount that would justify little, if any,
regulatory attention and a characterization of the harm that may deeply
offend.
V. CONCLUSION
As soon as it became clear that mercury contamination had the
potential to affect tribal rights and resources, EPA should have proceeded
differently than when its rules affect only non-Indian interests. EPA's inquiry
should have been differently framed. Importantly, EPA needed to confront
squarely the impact of its decision on tribes' fishing rights, rather than
consider these treaty-secured rights as a mere afterthought. As well, EPA's
process should have been differently conducted. EPA ought to have
consulted tribes from the outset of its rulemaking efforts, in an effort to
comprehend what was at stake from tribes' perspectives. In the end, EPA
should have evaluated and responded to the unjust impacts of mercury
contamination in a manner that ameliorated, rather than perpetuated, a long
history of cultural discrimination against tribes and their members.
If EPA means to contemplate and address environmental injustice in
the tribal context, EPA would do well to examine the missteps in its analysis
of the CAMR. Crucially, EPA should underfake such an examination in close
counsel with the various tribes, who are the only ones able to elaborate their
respective concerns.
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